ERISA Archives - Page 51 of 56 - McKennon Law Group

California Bans the Inclusion of Policy Provisions Giving Insurance Companies Discretionary Authority to Decide Claims

In a major victory for consumers, Governor Jerry Brown signed a bill that makes discretionary clauses – typically contained in ERISA-governed life, health and disability insurance policies/ERISA plans void and unenforceable in new or renewed policies. SB 621 was authored by Senate Insurance Committee Chair Ron Calderon (D-Montebello) and sponsored by Insurance Commissioner Dave Jones, and was similar to AB 1686 vetoed by Governor Schwarzenengger in 2010. Discretionary clauses are provisions typically found in group life, health and disability plans that give the administrator/insurer the sole discretion to interpret the policy and to decide if a plan participant or beneficiary is entitled to plan benefits. In ERISA cases, federal courts have interpreted these clauses to give administrators/insurers a higher standard of review when courts review their decisions. This meant that the federal courts were required to give greater deference to decisions denying plan benefits under life, health or disability coverages, rather than weighing all the evidence under a “de novo” standard of review and making their own determination as to whether the insured was entitled to benefits under the policy or employee welfare benefit plan. Insurance companies and plan administrators often rely on these clauses when they deny claims, knowing that the insured must demonstrate that the insurance company acted arbitrarily/abused their discretion – typically a burden – in order to prevail in a lawsuit against them. With the passage of this new law, insurance companies and plan administrators will no longer be able to rely on discretionary clauses in an attempt to insulate their decisions from critical judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, in the future, judges will no longer be required to defer to the decision of the insurance company and plan administrator, lessening the burden placed on ERISA plan participants and beneficiaries in seeking to overturn insurance claim denials. In voicing his support for the bill, Commissioner Jones explained:

“Discretionary clauses have been increasingly relied upon by insurers to reject legitimate claims for disability insurance when a consumer becomes disabled – insurers know that many consumers will give up their claim and that those who challenge the claim denial face a very high legal burden to overcome the denial since the discretionary clause vests sole discretion in the insurer to decide if the consumer is disabled. SB 621 levels the playing field and gives consumers an even chance to prove that they are entitled to disability and other insurance, by eliminating the ‘discretionary clauses’ that insurers have been putting into their insurance policies.”

SB 621 goes into effect on January 1, 2012

Ninth Circuit Rules that California’s Mental Parity Act Requires Health Insurers to Pay for Certain “Medically Necessary” Treatment for Mental Illnesses

In an important decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that California’s Mental Health Parity Act (“Parity Act” ) requires that health insurers cover certain medically necessary treatment for certain mental illnesses, even if the insurance policy explicitly excludes such coverage. In Harlick v. Blue Shield of Calif., __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. August 26, 2011), the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s granting of Blue Shield of California’s motion of summary judgment, and held that under the Parity Act, Blue Shield was required to provide medically necessary health insurance benefits for mental illnesses on par with the treatment for physical illness covered under Harlick’s ERISA-governed health insurance plan.

The California legislature enacted the Parity Act in 1999 after finding that “[m]ost private health insurance policies provide coverage for mental illness at levels far below coverage for other physical illnesses.” 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 534 (A.B.88), § 1 (West). The legislature further found that coverage limitations resulted in inadequate treatment of mental illnesses, causing “relapse and untold suffering” for people with treatable mental illnesses, as well as increases in homelessness, increases in crime and significant demands on the state budget. Id. Accordingly, plans that come within the scope of the Act – including the ERISA-governed plan established by Harlick’s employer – must cover all “medically necessary” treatment for nine listed mental illnesses (including anorexia nervosa), but can apply the same financial limits – such as yearly deductibles and lifetime benefits – that are applied to coverage for physical illnesses.

In March 2006, Jeanene Harlick (“Harlick”) was advised by her doctors to seek treatment for her anorexia nervosa at a residential treatment facility. After Harlick and her doctors concluded that none of the in-network treatment facilities suggested by Blue Shield could provide effective treatment, Harlick registered at Castlewood Treatment Center, a facility outside of the state and outside of Blue Shield’s treatment network. Harlick was at Castlewood, a residential treatment facility, for more than 8 months. However, Blue Shield refused to pay for Harlick’s care, because the plan specifically stated that “residential care” was not covered.

Harlick sued Blue Shield, but after the parties stipulated that Blue Shield’s decision would be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the district court granted Blue Shield’s motion for summary judgment.

In reviewing Harlick’s case, the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether Blue Shield abused its discretion in denying Harlick’s request for coverage for her treatment at Castlewood. In ERISA cases, if there is a conflict of interest (i.e., same entity pays benefits and makes the coverage decision), than the administrator’s review and claim decision is “tempered by skepticism,” even if it is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Here, while the Court did not find that Blue Shield abused its discretion in denying Harlick’s claim, it did find that Blue Shield was responsible for Harlick’s residential care, based upon the Parity Act. The Ninth Circuit stated:

Harlick’s Plan does not itself require that Blue Shield pay for residential care at Castlewood for her anorexia nervosa. However, California’s Mental Health Parity Act provides that Blue Shield “shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically necessary treatment” of “severe mental illness” including anorexia nervosa. Blue Shield is foreclosed from asserting that Harlick’s residential care at Castlewood was not medically necessary. We therefore conclude that Blue Shield is obligated under the Parity Act to pay for Harlick’s residential care at Castlewood, subject to the same financial terms and conditions it imposes on coverage for physical illness.

The Court then turned to the question of whether Harlick’s treatment was medically necessary. Blue Shield did not dispute that treatment at Castlewood was medically necessary until supplemental briefing filed after oral argument. Blue Shield argued that it should be allowed to reopen its administrative process in order to determine whether Harlick’s residential care was medically necessary. The Court explained an ERISA administrator’s obligations:

ERISA and its implementing regulations are undermined ‘where plan administrators have available sufficient information to assert a basis for denial of benefits, but choose to hold that basis in reserve rather than communicate it to the beneficiary.’ Mitchell v. CB Richard Ellis Long Term Disability Plan, 611 F.3d 1192, 1199 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Glista v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 113, 129 (1st Cir. 2004)). Claimants should not be ‘sandbagged by a rationale the plan administrator adduces only after the suit has commenced.’ Mitchell, 611 F.3d at 1199 n.2 (quoting Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003)) (some internal quotation marks omitted). Just as claimants should present all of their arguments for granting the claim to the insurer during the administrative process, an insurer should tell the claimant all of its reasons for denying the claim. Cf Diaz v. United Agric. Employee Welfare Benefit Plan & Trust, 50 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995).

During the administrative process, Blue Shield never said that it was denying the claim because treatment at Castlewood was not medically necessary.

The Court therefore concluded that by not including as a reason for denial of the claim that the treatment was not medically necessary, Blue Shield waived this reason to deny the claim:

Blue Shield has discretion to determine whether treatment is medically necessary during the administrative review process. But Blue Shield had to tell Harlick the “specific reasons for the denial” – not just one reason, if there was more than one – and provide a “full and fair review” of the denial. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (emphasis added). Blue Shield told both Harlick and her mother, as well as the DMHC, that medical necessity was not the reason for its denial of Harlick’s claim. It cannot now bring out a reason that it has “held in reserve” and commence a new round of review. See Mitchell, 611 F.3d at 1199 n.2.

Thus, even if it is expressly excluded from a plan, a California insurer is now obligated to ensure that coverage for certain medically necessary treatment for mental illness is on par with the coverage provided for necessary treatment for physical illnesses. This ruling will thus have significant application to coverage for mental illnesses, especially autism.

Insurers Cannot Escape Bad Faith Liability By Relying On In-House Experts And The “Genuine Dispute Doctrine”

Insurers often wrongfully deny policy benefits to their insureds in situations where there may be some uncertainty as to coverage. Despite an overarching duty to act reasonably and find in favor of coverage in such situations, insurers often will deny coverage and rely on their in-house medical experts’ (i.e., nurses, doctors) analysis and opinions as a basis for denial. In such situations, the insurer denies coverage at its peril.

California courts have consistently held that where there is a “genuine dispute” as to coverage, an insurer cannot be held liable for bad faith – this is known as the “genuine dispute doctrine.” However, an insurer’s reliance on the genuine dispute doctrine is often misplaced and misguided, and regularly results in substantial damages awards for plaintiffs for bad faith denial of coverage. California courts have routinely held that an insurer cannot “create” a genuine dispute to absolve itself from bad faith liability by relying on in-house experts. Instead, the courts have created an affirmative duty in such a situation to employ independent medical experts before making a coverage decision.

The recent decision of the District Court, Southern District of California in Barbour v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91060 (S.D. Cal. 2011), is a primary example of how an insurer’s misuse of in-house experts and its reliance on the “genuine dispute doctrine” can result in potential bad faith liability, as well as punitive damages.

Barbour involved a disability policy issued by UNUM through a school district and covering the Principal of a school in the district. The Group Salary Protection Insurance Policy (“Policy”) at issue provided Accident and Sickness Disability Benefits for one year in the event of total disability, and after one year, the Policy provided monthly long term disability income benefits for as long as the claimant remains totally disabled or otherwise qualifies for benefits, up to age 65. The Policy defined “Total Disability” during the first two years as the inability “to perform the material duties of your own occupation.” After two years, the Policy defined “Total Disability” as the inability “to engage in any gainful occupation for which you are reasonably qualified by training, education or experience.” In February 2003, the insured submitted a claim for disability benefits based on abdominal pain that restricted her from driving, walking/standing and sitting for extended period, and UNUM began paying benefits. Over the course of several years, the insured suffered multiple further injuries relating to her initial injury, which required multiple surgeries, and which rendered her totally disabled. The insured submitted regular medical reports and updates, and UNUM continued to pay disability benefits.

In December 2007, UNUM hired an investigator to conduct surveillance on the insured to confirm the claimed disabilities. The investigator observed a “female subject believed to be the insured” who was moving without the physical limitations represented to UNUM by the insured and her doctors. The investigator’s report and video raised suspicion within UNUM regarding the insured’s disability, and resulted in UNUM conducting further surveillance. UNUM investigators made a field visit in October 2008, and again conducted surveillance in January 2009. In February 2009, UNUM’s in-house doctor/consultant reviewed the file and prepared a report which concluded that the insured’s claimed disability was inconsistent with her findings. Then, in March 2009, UNUM’s “Designated Medical Officer” reviewed the file and determined that there were three occupations that the insured was capable of performing, notwithstanding her disability. UNUM thereafter revoked the insured’s disability benefits effective March 31, 2009, and advised her that she had the right to file a civil action under the section 502(a) ERISA statute. Unsurprisingly, the insured hired an attorney.

The insured’s attorney sent a letter to UNUM advising that UNUM’s determination that the claim was governed by ERISA was erroneous. The attorney also provided a letter from the insured’s doctor stating that the person observed during surveillance in December 2007 was not the insured. UNUM was also provided a functional capacity evaluation by the insured’s physical therapist that concluded that the insured’s “physical limitations presented a barrier to work.” This information was reviewed by UNUM’s in-house medical experts. On October 6, 2009, UNUM sent a letter agreeing with the insured’s position as to ERISA, but stating that the new medical information did not change UNUM’s decision to deny benefits.

UNUM filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the insured’s claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad faith), intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. To defeat the bad faith claim, UNUM relied on the “genuine dispute doctrine.” In rendering its ruling, the court noted that the overarching issue in a bad faith claim is whether the insurer’s claims-handling conduct was reasonable. Amadeo v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 2002). The court then explained the applicability of the genuine dispute doctrine:

“The genuine issue rule in the context of bad faith claims allows a district court to grant summary judgment when it is undisputed or indisputable that the basis for the insurer’s denial of benefits was reasonable–for example, where even under the plaintiff’s version of the facts there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under California law. In such a case, because a bad faith claim can succeed only if the insurer’s conduct was unreasonable, the insurer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Amadeo, 290 F.3d at 1161-62 (citation omitted). “On the other hand, an insurer is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law where, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could conclude that the insurer acted unreasonably.” Id. at 1162 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).

The court held that a reasonable jury could conclude that UNUM acted unreasonably when it was informed that the evidence UNUM relied upon to deny the insured’s claim was wrong (i.e., the surveillance was of someone other than the insured). The court further determined that there was no evidence that UNUM’s experts evaluated the evidence with an eye towards favoring the insured and in a manner which would indicate that she was indeed disabled as she and her doctors asserted. The court relied upon the facts as viewed “in the light most favorable to Plaintiff” to determine that a jury could conclude that UNUM acted unreasonably, and thus in bad faith when it denied the insured’s claim. The court therefore denied UNUM’s motion for summary judgment.

The court also discussed UNUM’s initial erroneous determination that the claim was governed by ERISA, and held that it created evidence of insurer bias, which could also indicate and support a claim for bad faith. Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 4th 335, 348 (2001)).

The court placed a premium on UNUM’s apparent failure to reasonably and thoroughly investigate the insured’s claim. In particular, the court found that UNUM’s failure to seek an independent medical examination of the insured supported her claim that UNUM acted unreasonably. In so finding, the court discussed a line of cases which suggest that an insurer’s sole reliance on its own in-house experts, and its failure to obtain an independent medical examination, is clear evidence that an insurer has acted unreasonably.

Based on these findings, the court held that the insured’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for punitive damages were equally as viable based on UNUM’s potentially unreasonable conduct in evaluating the insured’s claim.

With this decision, the court made it very clear that an insurer cannot escape liability for bad faith by relying on its own in-house experts and ignoring evidence presented by an insured which, when viewed in favor of the insured, would indicate coverage should be afforded. An insurer cannot create a “genuine dispute” as to coverage on which it can deny an insured’s claim simply by relying on its own in-house experts. An insurer who does so, does so at its own peril, and opens itself up to claims for bad faith and punitive damages.

An Insurance Company Acting as a Claims Administrator is Again a Proper Defendant in an ERISA Suit for Benefits

The Ninth Circuit has reversed itself and ruled that insurance companies that make claim decisions or are responsible for paying benefits can serve as defendants in ERISA actions for benefits or to enforce the terms of the plan. In Cyr v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, 642 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit overruled some of its earlier precedents, including Everhart v. Allmerica Financial Life Insurance Company, 275 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2001), and ruled that potential liability under 29 U.S.C. section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA is not limited to the benefit plan or the Plan Administrator. In explaining this shift, which allows insurance companies that make the claim decision or are responsible for paying benefits to be named as a defendant, the Ninth Circuit stated:

Some of our previous decisions have indicated that only a benefit plan itself or the plan administrator of a benefit plan covered under ERISA is a proper defendant in a lawsuit under [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)]. We conclude that the statute does not support that limitation, however, and that an entity other than the plan itself or the plan administrator may be sued under that statute in appropriate circumstances.

Laura Cyr was covered under a group long-term disability plan provided by her employer, Channel Technologies, Inc. Cyr was awarded disability benefits by Reliance Standard, but a dispute arose regarding whether her monthly benefits should be increased in light of a settlement with her employer over a dispute alleging gender discrimination based on unequal pay. Cyr named Reliance Standard as one of the defendants, but the district court granted Reliance Standard’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that only the plan or the plan administrator could be held liable under section 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court then reversed its ruling in response to the parties’ supplemental briefing and awarded summary judgment to Cyr.

Reliance Standard appealed the decision, and the Ninth Circuit heard the case en banc. In considering only the issue of whether an insurer/claim administrator is a proper defendant in an action to recover benefits under the terms of the plan, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[b]y its terms, § 1132(a)(1)(B) does not appear to limit which parties may be proper defendants in a civil action. Nor has the Secretary of Labor promulgated a regulation setting out such limits.” The Ninth Circuit analyzed the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Harris Trust & Saving Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2008) which examined a similar issue with respect to § 1132(a)(3) and noted that the section “makes no mention at all of which parties may be proper defendants—the focus, instead, is on redressing the ‘act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title I]’” Given the Supreme Court’s analysis of § 1132(a)(3), the Ninth Circuit could “see no reason to read a limitation into § 1132(a)(1)(B).”

The Ninth Circuit explained that, in this litigation, Reliance Standard was a proper defendant because:

Reliance denied Cyr’s request for increased benefits even though, as the plan insurer, it was responsible for paying legitimate benefit claims. Reliance is, therefore, a logical defendant for an action by Cyr to recover benefits due to her under the terms of the plan and to enforce her rights under the terms of the plan, which is precisely the civil action authorized by § 1132(a)(1)(B).

With this ruling, the Ninth Circuit specifically overruled its previous rulings to the contrary, including Everhart, Ford v. MCI Communications Corp. Health & Welfare Plan, 399 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005), Spain v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 13 F.3d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1993) and Gelardi v. Pertec Computer Corp., 761 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1985).

While, on its face, this case seems to impose liability on insurance companies they did not previously face, in reality, this is not the case. In most ERISA cases for life insurance benefits, health insurance benefits or disability insurance benefits for which the insurance company was financially responsible, the insurance company typically controlled the defense of these lawsuits and paid any amounts due after a settlement or judgment, regardless of whether it was named as a defendant. This decision realized the practical reality that insurance companies should be allowed defendants in ERISA cases involving life insurance benefits, health insurance benefits or disability insurance benefits for which insurance companies are financially responsible. This decision simply put into law what was already happening in actual practice.

What are the Available Remedies Against an Insurance Company That Has Acted in Bad Faith?

This article will be the second in a series of articles by McKennon Law Group PC addressing and answering basic questions concerning insurance law. This one addresses: What are the available remedies against an insurance company that has acted unreasonably in handling an insurance claim?

The most common causes of action against insurers in the non-ERISA context are breach of contract and bad faith.

The breach of contract claim allows an insured to recover policy benefits owed under the insurance policy plus applicable interest from the date the benefits were due (or at the rate of 10% on delayed disability payments in California). The benefits due will depend on the type of policy at issue. They may be a specific amount (e.g., death benefits) or may depend upon a proof of loss (e.g., value of property damaged or destroyed).

The bad faith (aka breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing) claim potentially allows an insured/policyholder to recover future damages owed under the policy (in disability cases), attorneys’ fees, consequential damages (economic damages caused by the bad faith conduct, such as medical bills as a result of emotional distress, interest paid on borrowed funds, loss on investment where there was a forced sale caused by insurer’s denial, lost investment opportunities because personal funds had to be used to pay expenses), emotional distress and punitive damages.

There are three primary categories of damages recoverable in these types of actions:

Contract Damages – In first-party cases, the measure of contract damages is the benefits due under the policy. In third-party cases, the measure is the amount expended or liability incurred by the insured up to the policy limits. Consequential damages are also recoverable where appropriate, and are defined as those damages the parties should have foreseen as likely to result from a breach when they entered into the contract. Thus, an insured may recover damages that were within the parties’ reasonable expectation at the time of contracting.
Tortious (Extracontractual) Compensatory Damages – In bad faith actions, an insured may recover extracontractual compensatory damages based on an insurer’s tortious conduct. This includes all damages caused by the insurer’s tortious conduct, including both economic loss and non-economic harm (e.g., emotional distress). This will often include attorney’s fees reasonably incurred to compel payment of benefits due under an insurance policy (called Brandt fees).
Punitive Damages – In an action against an insurer where, in addition to bad faith or other tortious conduct, there is clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice on the part of the insurer, the insured may recover punitive damages. Punitive damages will be awarded to punish an insurer for tortious conduct giving rise to an action not based on the terms of the insurance contract (e.g., fraud).

In addition to breach of contract and bad faith, other claims available to insureds are fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and intentional interference with economic advantage. Each of these causes of action may allow for recovery of alternative and additional damages, including punitive damages.

For additional information on this and other insurance matters you can visit the FAQ section of our website: www.mslawllp.com.

If you need to consult with an attorney about a possible insurance bad faith or ERISA matter, please contact our office.

Claim Administrator’s Failure to Contact Treating Physicians Found To Be An Abuse Of Discretion Under ERISA

Under ERISA, insurers/claim administrators are required to give every insurance claim a full and fair review. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have construed this requirement in a manner that requires insurers/claim administrators to do more than simply have an in-house physician or nurse conduct a paper review of medical records. This trend continues with the decision in Galloway, et. al. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45866 (W.D. Wash. April 28, 2011).

From 2000 to 2008, Galloway worked as a machinist for Turbine Engine Components Technologies Corporation (“TECT”). On January 1, 2002, Lincoln National issued a group life insurance policy to TECT and on October 14, 2004, Galloway, a TECT employee at the time, enrolled in the policy. The policy contains a provision ensuring continued coverage, without payment of premiums, if a participant becomes totally disabled.

In January 2008, Galloway stopped working at TECT due to Achilles tendonitis. In July 2008, Galloway requested that Lincoln National grant him a waiver from paying premiums on his life insurance policy due to his total disability.

Lincoln National investigated Galloway’s claim of total disability relying on primarily the medical reports provided by Galloway’s podiatrist. Lincoln National did not request additional information regarding the restrictions Galloway reported on his Rehabilitation Survey, nor did it ask Galloway when the self-reported restrictions began, which would have been necessary information for it to determine whether he satisfied the relevant elimination period. The only additional information Lincoln National requested from Galloway, before denying his claim, was an Educational Assessment. The record indicated, however, that Lincoln National intended to deny his claim even before sending him the Educational Assessment form.

After litigation ensued, the court granted the Estate’s motion to supplement the administrative record with the declaration of Dr. Robert T. Fraser, Ph.D., who was the Estate’s vocational assessment expert. In doing so, the court held that the Fraser declaration evidenced Lincoln National’s failure to conduct a proper vocational assessment of Galloway’s self-reported limitations. The court held that this failure prevented the full development of the administrative record, relying on Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).

The court decided to remand the matter back to Lincoln National so that the parties could conduct a “meaningful dialogue” about Galloway’s self-reported symptoms. Lincoln National once again conducted a cursory review of Galloway’s claim – primarily limited to asking an independent expert to review reports from his podiatrist – but made no attempt to secure additional information regarding Galloway’s reported restrictions and limitations. The limited nature of Lincoln National’s investigation did not prevent it from denying Galloway’s waiver of premium claim again after remand.

The court reviewed Lincoln National’s decision under the abuse of discretion standard of review and ruled that Lincoln National abused its discretion because it failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the basis for Galloway’s request for a premium waiver in large part because it failed to contact Galloway’s treating physician. Specifically, the court ruled:

Here, the legal question before the court is whether Lincoln National abused its discretion in denying Mr. Galloway a waiver of premiums. This determination depends on whether Lincoln National requested the needed information and offered a rational reason for its denial of Mr. Galloway’s claim. See Booton v. Lockheed Med. Benefit Plan, 110 F.3d 1461, 1463 (9th Cir. 1997). If Lincoln National meets this standard its decision to deny benefits would be given substantial deference. Id. After a review of the record before and after remand, the court finds that Lincoln National failed to follow-up with Mr. Galloway, or any medical expert, regarding the limitations Mr. Galloway listed in his self-assessment that, if true, rendered him completely disabled during the elimination period.

Thus, Lincoln National’s denial of benefits was not based on a full and fair review of the record as required by ERISA and Ninth Circuit authority. See id. (“Lacking necessary—and easily obtainable—information, [the plan administrator] made its decision blindfolded.”); see also Saffon v. Wells Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 863, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2008) (the plan administrator must give a “fair chance” to the beneficiary to present evidence to support her claim); see also Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that to deny the claim without explanation and without obtaining relevant information is an abuse of discretion). As it turned out, the opportunity for Lincoln National to engage in a meaningful dialogue with Mr. Galloway, before or after it made the initial denial decision, was cut short by the death of Mr. Galloway only a month later.

On remand, Lincoln National was given a second opportunity to attempt a full and fair review of Mr. Galloway’s claimed restrictions. The evidence actually garnered during remand, however, only further exemplified why a meaningful dialogue is required in the first place. On remand, the information provided by the treating physicians supported the claimed restrictions in Mr. Galloway’s self-assessment. These restrictions should have formed the basis of Lincoln National’s original review but, due to its failure to consider fully the claims made by Mr. Galloway before denying his claim, it never contacted his treating physicians.

Lincoln National’s decision to deny Mr. Galloway’s claim without obtaining all the required information and without engaging in a meaningful dialogue with him was an abuse of discretion. Moreover, had it engaged in any dialogue with Mr. Galloway, Lincoln National would have learned that two of his treating physicians believed him to be unable to perform any work, including sedentary work. Based on the record before the court, and on its finding that Lincoln National abused its discretion in denying Mr. Galloway the requested waiver of premiums for his life insurance policy, the court orders Lincoln National to pay life insurance benefits to the Estate of Mr. Galloway. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, because Lincoln National failed to contact Galloway’s treating physicians and otherwise failed to properly gather medical information related to Galloway’s claim, he was denied a full-and-fair review owed to all ERISA claimants. The court determined that Lincoln National’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation and failure to engage in a “meaningful dialogue” with Galloway regarding the claim resulted in an abuse of its discretion, and order Lincoln National to pay the full death benefits due under the policy.

If you believe you have an individual or ERISA-governed life insurance, health insurance or disability insurance policy issued by Lincoln National, or any other insurer, for which you have failed to properly receive benefits, contact McKennon Law Group PC for a free consultation.

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