ERISA Archives - Page 51 of 54 - McKennon Law Group

Under ERISA , Procedural Deficiencies Not Considered When the Standard of Review is De Novo

Litigation pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) is rather unique. Unlike most cases, ERISA disputes are based on a limited scope of permissible evidence. The range of that scope is ultimately dependent on which standard of review is employed by the courts. Typically, when the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the scope of admissible evidence is limited to what was before the claims administrator when the claims decision was made, i.e. the “administrative record.” The reason for this limited subset of evidence is based on the sole question before the court, namely “Did the claim administrative abuse its discretion in rendering its decision?” Obviously, evidence discovered or submitted after the claims decision was made would be irrelevant to that question, hence the narrow scope. However, when the standard of review is de novo, the question before the court changes to whether or not the claimant is entitled to benefits. In other words, it is simply whether or not the claimant is disabled. Consequently, this change in question also alters the realm of admissible evidence.

Recently, the court in Ermovick vs. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knump LLP Long Term Disability Plan, 2010 WL 3956819 (Decided October 8, 2010), addressed the question of whether evidence of procedural deficiencies should be considered in the context of a de novo review. The facts are relatively straight forward. James Ermovick worked as a word processor at the law firm of Mitchell, Silberberg & Knump. His claim for disability benefits was based on depression, anxiety and pain radiating in his back and neck due to myeloradiculopathy. Ermovick claimed to be totally disabled from any occupation while Prudential, the claims administrator, believed his disability to be temporary and therefore denied his benefits claim.

Eventually, the case found its way the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. There, the court held that the proper standard of review was de novo and sought to address the case on the merits. Ermovick sought to offer evidence of certain procedural deficiencies. Specifically, Ermovick alleged that Prudential failed to conduct any meaningful review of the evidence and arbitrarily denied his claim without a proper review. He further argued that Prudential denied his claim based on a lack of information while at the same time failing to tell him what information was missing. Normally, this type of evidence is highly relevant because it can, if true, show that the claim administrator violated its duty to make a proper and informed claims decision. More importantly, it undermines the arguments and credibility of the claims administrator.

The problem the court faced was that the evidence, although relevant to the issue of Prudential’s credibility, was ultimately irrelevant on the narrow issue of whether Ermovick was disabled. Not to be deterred, Ermovick cited to the 10th Circuit case of Niles v. American Airlines, Inc., 269 Fed. Appx. 827, 833 (10th Cir.2008), which held that “[a] showing that the administrator failed to follow ERISA procedures therefore provides a basis for reversal separate from that provided by de novo review of the merits of the claim.” There, the court in Niles concluded that such procedural deficiencies effectively created an independent basis for reversal of a claims administrator’s decision. However, not every circuit believed this to be the case. For example, the Sixth Circuit took a more hard-line view. In Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare System, Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir.1998), the court found that analysis of procedural deficiencies were not necessary under a de novo review provided that the denial of benefits was correct. If the decision made by the claims administrator was ultimately the right one, then the convoluted manner in which it reached that conclusion was irrelevant.

Since existing case law in the Ninth Circuit did not provide clear guidance, the court in Ermovick came to the conclusion that it should follow the Sixth Circuit rational based on Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F. 3d 955 (9th Cir. 2006). In Abatie, the Ninth Circuit held that “even in instances of wholesale and flagrant violations of the procedural requirements of ERISA, the Court’s remedy is to accord no deference to the Plan and review the record de novo.” By according no deference, the Ninth Circuit left no room for an independent basis for reversal. The Ermovick court interpreted this holding to mean that to give “no deference” also equates to providing to no weight to procedural deficiencies. There was, of course, one exception to this rule. Where the procedural deficiencies caused the record itself to be incomplete, then the court may supplement the administrative record with additional evidence.

In Ermovick, since neither party asked to supplement the record, the court reasoned that the administrative record was complete. As a result, the court held that evidence of procedural deficiencies was not necessary when the standard of review was de novo. On that basis, the court proceeded to conduct its own independent review of the record which revealed that despite the errors in handling the case, Prudential’s decision to terminate benefits was correct.

Assuming the Ninth Circuit doesn’t reverse this decision on appeal, it seems clear that when the standard of review is de novo, the court will not consider procedural deficiencies in ERISA cases.

Governor Schwarzenegger Vetoes AB 1868 That Would Have Banned Discretionary Clauses in Group Insurance Policies

Today Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed AB 1868 that would have banned discretionary clauses in group insurance policies. This is a disappointment to consumer groups but not to insurers who rely on them. Currently, the Department of Insurance bans them in group policies anyway. Here are the Governor’s comments on why it was vetoed:

To the Members of the California State Assembly:

I am returning Assembly Bill 1868 without my signature.

This bill would prohibit the Insurance Commissioner from approving any disability or

life insurance policy if it includes a provision that would reserve discretionary authority

to the insurer to determine eligibility for benefits, and voids certain provisions of a policy

or agreement if it provides or funds life insurance or disability insurance coverage.

This bill is unnecessary, as the Insurance Commissioner already has the authority to

prohibit the use of discretionary clauses.

For this reason I cannot sign this bill.

Sincerely,

Arnold Schwarzenegger

Disability Policy Discretionary Clauses Come Under Congressional Attack

Policyholder/Employee groups who have group disability insurance coverage through their employers and who find themselves operating in the byzantine world of ERISA have long criticized discretionary clauses contained in such ERISA policies. These often have the effect of giving insurance companies firmer ground to support claim denials because the “abuse of discretion” standard of review typically applies. This higher standard of review makes it more difficult for policyholders/employees to challenge disability claim denials.

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has the opportunity to sign California Assembly Bill 1868 (“AB 1868”) and to prohibit these discretionary clauses. In the recent case of Standard Insurance Company v. Morrison, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the California Insurance Commissioner has the authority to disapprove any disability insurance policies that contain discretionary clauses.

Arthur Postal of National Underwriter writes about such clauses in an article entitled “Disability Policy Discretionary Clauses Come Under Fire.” Here is a reprint of it:

WASHINGTON BUREAU — The long-term disability insurance (LTD) industry took a licking today during a Senate Finance Committee hearing.

Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, D-Mont., said LTD insurers have doctors with conflicts of interest review claims.

“Many of these doctors are employed either by the insurance company or by companies that do a lot of business with the insurance company,” Baucus said. “These arrangements make it far too easy for the doctors to deny claims, terminate claims, or reject appeals.”

Ronald Leebove, a rehabilitation counselor who appeared for the American Board of Forensic Counselors, Springfield, Mo., said private group LTD policies fail to provide the protection insurers promise.

“There are many tricks and tactics used by the insurance companies to deny claims,” Leebove said.

Several witnesses talked about employers’ and insurers’ use of Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) provisions to give plan administrators’ discretion over LTD benefits decisions, and to ward off challenges of benefits determinations.

Mark DeBofsky, a partner at Daley, DeBofsky & Bryant, Chicago, a law firm, said the courts have gone against legislative intent and transformed ERISA into “a shield that protects insurance companies from having to face the consequences of unprincipled benefit denials and other breaches of fiduciary duty.”

In most cases involving LTD claim disputes, there is not even a trial, DeBofsky said.

“Instead,” DeBofsky said, “courts conduct reviews of claim records assembled and shaped by self-serving insurance companies without hearing any testimony whatsoever, under a procedure that gives more deference to the insurance company than a court would give a Social Security administrative law judge in its review of a Social Security disability benefit claim denial.”

Judge William Acker Jr., a senior district court judge in northern Alabama, testified that the “courts have not rescued ERISA” in its handling of long-term disability cases. “If anything, they have dug the ERISA hole deeper,” Acker said. “ERISA jurisprudence will stay as messed up as it is unless Congress reworks it.”

Paul Graham, a senior vice president at the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI), Washington, defended disability insurers.

Disability insurance can be susceptible to fraud and abuse, and many states have passed regulations that require short-term disability (STD) insurance and long-term disability disability insurance companies to report instances of suspected fraud, Graham said.

“While fulfilling their contractual and regulatory responsibilities, insurers need to remain attentive to potentially fraudulent claims,” Graham said.

Therefore, he said, an eligibility determination, whether made by the insurance carrier or other fiduciary, is only valid for the information at that point in time and must be periodically re-evaluated to account for changes in the claimant’s condition.

Graham said a 2008 industry study that included a majority of group disability carriers found that 79% of submitted claims were approved.

Of those claims not approved, over 25% were not paid because the claimant recovered too quickly to collect benefits, Graham testified.

The Waiver Doctrine, Alive And Well in ERISA Cases

The Wednesday August 11, 2010 edition of the Los Angeles Daily Journal featured my article, entitled “The Waiver Doctrine, Alive And Well in ERISA Cases,” in the Perspective column. It explains a very recent case from the Ninth Cirhttp://www.dailyjournal.comcuit Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. CB Richard Ellis Long Term Disability Plan, 2010 DJDAR 11532 (9th Cir. July 26). The article is posted below with permission of Daily Journal Corp. (2010).

New Appeal Regulations For Health Plans Require Final Claims Decision To Be Made By External Reviewer

The Department of Health and Human Services issued new appeal regulations under the recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”). These regulations give claimants the right to appeal decisions made by their health plan to an outside, independent decision maker, regardless of what state they live in or what type of health coverage they have, i.e., both group and individual coverage. If a particular health plan or insurance is governed by a state law, the state regulations will apply as long as the protections offered to consumers is at least as strong as the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) Model Act. At a minimum, the state external review process must provide:

External Review of plan decisions to deny coverage for case based on medical necessity, appropriateness, health care setting, level of care, or effectiveness of a covered benefit.
Clear information for consumers about their right to both internet and external appeals – both in the standard plan materials, and at the time the company denies a claim.
Expedited access to external review in some cases – including emergency situation, or cases where their health plan did not follow the rules in the internal appeal.
Health plans must pay the cost of the external appeal under State law, and States may not require consumers to pay more than a nominal fee.
Review by an independent body assigned by the State. The State must also ensure that the reviewers meet certain standards, keep written records, and are not affected by conflict of interest.
Emergency process for urgent claims, and a process for experimental or investigational treatment.
Final decision must be binding so, if the consumer wins, the health plan is expected to pay for the benefit that was previously denied.[1]

For plans governed by ERISA or not otherwise covered by a state law external appeal process, a federal external review program will be required. Since these are still interim rules, a framework for the federal external review process has not been established. However, the federal review process will likely be modeled along the NAIC Model Act.

These regulations are clearly a win for consumers who have long complained that the internal appeals process is biased towards insurance companies. Unfortunately, it will take some time for consumers to reap the benefits of these changes. Health plans that were in effect on March 23, 2010 and have not been significantly modified since then are considered “grandfathered” and not subject to these regulations. However, over time, expect to see an external review process become a standard component of the claim review process.

[1] Source: “Fact Sheet: The Affordable Care Act: Protecting Consumers and Putting Patients Back in Charge of Their Care,” dated July 22, 2010.

Ninth Circuit Applies New Hardt Decision to Deny ERISA Participant Attorney’s Fees

Last month, the U.S. Supreme Court handed ERISA plan participants a big victory when they decided the important ERISA disability case of Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance, __ U.S. __ (Decided May 24, 2010)(see our blog discussion here) holding that an ERISA plan participant may be able to collect attorneys’ fees from a plan or claim administrator without obtaining a judgment in the action. It did not take long for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to apply Hardt. In Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti Disability Plan, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. June 24, 2010), the court rejected a plan participant’s claim for attorney’s fees. In Simonia, Aleck Simonia became physically disabled due to a herniated disc. He had disability insurance under his employer’s group insurance plan, which was ultimately insured by the Hartford Insurance Co. Hartford concluded that Simonia was no longer physically disabled but had a mental disorder subject to his ERISA plan’s twelve-month payment limit. Hartford also learned that Simonia had been awarded $1,551 per month in Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits retroactively, which should have been offset against his payments from Hartford. Thus, Hartford informed Simonia he would be receiving payments subject to the plan’s twelve-month mental disorder limit and that he owed Hartford $22,310. Simonia sued Hartford for improperly reclassifying his disability as a mental disorder. Hartford filed a counterclaim to recover its overpayment. Simonia informed Hartford that the Social Security Administration had retroactively reduced his SSDI award, and he requested that Hartford recalculate the alleged overpayment. The parties later settled the counterclaim and stipulated to its dismissal. Simonia did not prevail in his claims against Hartford for continuing benefits. Simonia thereafter filed a motion seeking $63,745 in attorney’s fees because he “was successful as a counter-defendant in that the defendant dismissed its counterclaim.” The district court, applying the five factors in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1980), denied the motion for fees. Simonia appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court initially explained that the Supreme Court in Hardt expressly declined to foreclose the possibility that, once a court has determined that a litigant has achieved some degree of success on the merits, it may then evaluate the traditional five factors under Hummell, before exercising its discretion to award attorney’s fees. Thus, once a court has found that a litigant has made the Hardt showing, it must consider, under Hummell, the opposing parties’ culpability and ability to pay fees, whether an award would deter similar conduct, whether the claimant sought to benefit all beneficiaries or resolve a significant issue, and the merits of the parties’ positions. The court held that even assuming Simonia achieved some degree of success on the merits, fees would be inappropriate according to the relevant factors. The court explained its rationale:

First, there is no “culpability” or “bad faith” evidenced by Hartford’s actions. Simonia began receiving retroactive SSDI benefits in 2006. Under Simonia’s policy, these benefits –when combined with certain forms of income–offset his award from Hartford. At the time Hartford filed its counterclaim, it had a good faith belief that Simonia had been overpaid by $22,309.51, and that the deduction of Simonia’s remaining mental disorder benefits would result in a balance due of $8,589. Hartford was then informed that Simonia’s SSDI benefits had been retroactively reduced. Hartford thereafter stipulated to a dismissal of the counterclaim. These actions evidence good faith. Second, Hartford undoubtedly has the ability to satisfy an award of fees. However, no single Hummell factor is necessarily decisive. See Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984). Third, given Hartford’s good faith actions, we do not wish to deter others from acting in the same manner. Fourth, in seeking to settle the counterclaim following the Social Security Administration’s retroactive reduction in benefits, Simonia did not seek “to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA.” Hummell, 634 F.2d at 453. Instead, as the district court found, Simonia sought to benefit only himself. Finally, the district court correctly noted that the counterclaim was meritorious when it was filed. When the Social Security Administration’s adjustment allegedly deprived the counterclaim of merit, Hartford settled and voluntarily dismissed. The district court did not exceed the permissible bounds of its discretion in determining that the Hummell factors weigh against an award of attorney’s fees. Even assuming that, as Simonia argues, Hartford mistakenly calculated the amount of overpayment and the counterclaim was of questionable merit when filed, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that Hartford acted in bad faith. On the contrary, Hartford’s subsequent voluntary dismissal is indicative of its good faith in this matter. Simonia’s claim would therefore still fail after considering all of the factors.

This was an easy decision for the Ninth Circuit as there was not a good basis for the plaintiff to argue for attorney’s fees here. However, it is also a rare case where ERISA claimants applied for and do not receive an award of attorney’s fees in an ERISA action.

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