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The Wednesday July 11, 2012 edition of the Los Angeles Daily Journal featured Robert McKennon’s and Scott Calvert’s article entitled: “Equitable Relief in the Ninth Circuit Just Got Better for Consumers.” In it, Mr. McKennon and Mr. Calvert discuss two important Ninth Circuit rulings allowing certain equitable relief to ERISA plan participants that have definite pro-consumer holdings. The article is posted below with the permission of the Daily Journal.
California Court of Appeal Upholds Insurance Coverage for Health Net Finding The “Dishonest Acts” Exclusion Did Not Preclude Coverage
In Health Net, Inc. v. RLI Insurance Company, et al., the California Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed a trial court’s entry of judgment on a Motion for Summary Judgment finding some coverage for Health Net, Inc. (“Health Net”) in connection with numerous lawsuits filed against it arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Health Net brought suit against four of its insurers (one primary and three excess carriers) seeking a declaratory judgment that the insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify Health Net in over 20 underlying actions involving Health Net’s insurance plans provided by employers, which plans were subject to the requirements of the ERISA. The parties, however, directed their attention to two specific underlying actions, as the amount of indemnity sought in those actions would far exceed the combined policy limits of the defendant insurers. Relying on a policy exclusion for “dishonest acts,” the trial court granted summary adjudication to the insurers with respect to Health Net’s claim for reimbursement of its defense costs and the costs of settling the specified underlying actions. The parties subsequently settled their dispute regarding the remaining underlying actions, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the insurers. Health Net appealed the ruling.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals first addressed whether the two underlying actions at issue sought damages covered by Health Net’s insurance policies. The court concluded that the great bulk of the claims asserted in the underlying actions were not covered, but there was a potential for coverage for some of them. The court held that in the “Insuring Agreement” of the applicable policies, including a “HMO/PPO/Managed Health Care Professional Liability” policy, did not provide coverage for the insured’s contractual obligations, even if the insured committed a wrongful act in its failure to pay such benefits.
Second, the court addressed the “dishonest acts” exclusion, and considered whether it barred, as a matter of law, coverage for all of the otherwise covered claims in the underlying actions. The court concluded that, while the “dishonest acts” exclusion was triggered with respect to the underlying actions, the exclusion barred coverage only for those claims alleging dishonest acts, not the entirety of the underlying actions. As some claims for indemnity and defense costs relating to the two underlying actions at issue remained, the court reversed the summary judgment.
Because the court concluded that the “dishonest acts” exclusion relied upon by the trial court excluded some, but not all, of the underlying claims, some of which might potentially allege a covered loss, it remanded the case to the trial court “to determine whether and to what extent there is any merit to the claim of coverage.”
Ninth Circuit Confirms That Plan Language Controls In The Absence of Detrimental Reliance on SPD Language
In Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Retirement Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s ruling in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) wherein the high court ruled that ERISA “summary documents, important as they are, provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but that their statements do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan for purposes of § 502(a)(1)(B).” (The holding in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara was discussed in our blog) While the Ninth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court’s logic and ruling, it left open the possibility that language contained only in the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) could be enforced if a claimant relied on that language.
In Skinner, two retirees sued for additional retirement benefits under an ERISA-governed pension plan. The retirees alleged that their pension benefits should be calculated using the formula set forth in the SPD, rather than the plan documents. The Plan moved for, and was granted summary judgment by the trial court on the grounds that the retirees had not raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the proper amount of pension benefits they were entitled to receive.
At the district court level, all parties agreed that the plaintiffs were strictly limited “to obtain other appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the Amara Court stated that, under appropriate circumstances, § 502(a)(3) may authorize three possible equitable remedies: estoppel, reformation, and surcharge.” The retirees only sought reformation and surcharge. The Ninth Circuit rejected the reformation claim because there was no evidence that the plan documents “fail[ed] to reflect that drafter’s true intent” or “that Northrop Plan B contains terms that were induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence.” Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the ERISA claimants were not entitled to a surcharge remedy because it found that “by failing to enforce the terms of the 2003 SPD instead of the terms of the plan master document” there was “no evidence that the committee gained a benefit by failing to ensure that participants received an accurate SPD” did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.
While the Ninth Circuit ruled against the retirees, it noted that they did not make an estoppel argument because “they presented no evidence of reliance on the inaccurate SPD.” Thus, while the Ninth Circuit found that, in this particular instance, the language of the plan documents would be enforced over the language in the SPD, the Court acknowledged that if a claimant could demonstrate reliance on the SPD, the language in the SPD might well control.
Such a ruling is consistent with the recent ruling in the District Court of Puerto Rico where the court rejected the defendant’s argument that Amara found that equitable estoppel is not an appropriate avenue for relief under ERISA. Indeed, the court noted that “equitable estoppel forms a very essential element in . . . fair dealing, and rebuke of all fraudulent misrepresentation, which it is the boast of courts of equity constantly to promote.” See Guerra-Delgado v. Popular, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44432 (D. P.R. March 29, 2012) (internal quotations removed).
MetLife Cannot Require an IME After Failing to Comply with ERISA Deadlines Following a Remand of Disability Claim
In Kroll v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Long Term Disability Plan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25063 (N.D. Cal. February 10, 2012), the Court refused to require that the plaintiff appear for an independent medical examination (“IME”) because Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) failed to request the IME within 45 days, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. With the ruling, the District Court confirmed that the time limits set forth in the Department of Labor regulation apply to claims that are remanded to an ERISA administrator following litigation. On May 13, 2011, the Court ruled that MetLife abused its discretion and improperly denied plaintiff’s claim for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits made under an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan. With the ruling, the Court ordered that MetLife pay all benefits due under the policy’s “own occupation” definition of disability, and remanded the claim back to MetLife for a determination under the “any occupation” definition. In connection with the remand, plaintiff’s counsel wrote to MetLife’s counsel requesting the forms needed to pursue the remanded LTD claim. On May 16, 2011, he was informed that MetLife would let him know what documents and information would be required. Unwilling to wait for MetLife to act, in June 2011, plaintiff sent MetLife just under 1,000 pages of medical records in connection with her claim. Five months later, in October 2011, MetLife finally provided plaintiff with claim forms and requested information to review the claim. MetLife also ordered the plaintiff to appear for an IME, but her counsel objected that the request was untimely pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(3). With the plaintiff refusing to appear for the IME, MetLife filed a motion to compel the examination. While MetLife argued that 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 did not apply to its actions because the disability claim was remanded to MetLife following litigation, the District Court noted that MetLife failed to provide any authority to support that position. The Court ultimately rejected MetLife’s argument, explaining that the plain language of the regulation, which “sets forth minimum requirements for employee benefit plan procedures pertaining to claims for benefits by participants and beneficiaries,” applies to the remand of the LTD claim. In denying MetLife’s motion, the District Court explained that:
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(3), Defendants had until June 27, 2011, to either make a determination on Plaintiff’s claim, or make a determination that more time was needed to resolve Plaintiff’s claim and notify Plaintiff. Defendants did neither. After hearing nothing from Defendants, Plaintiff, on her own initiative, sent over her medical records to Defendants. The first time Defendants indicated that they needed more information was in October 2011, five months after the Court remanded the claim for consideration.
Given MetLife’s failure to act within the time limits set by 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1, the District Court held that “it is too late for [MetLife] to further delay by seeking an IME.” Finally, the District Court ruled that “[p]ursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(l), Plaintiff’s claim for long term disability benefits under the ‘any occupation’ standard is deemed exhausted,” and the plaintiff could therefore initiate further litigation regarding MetLife’s failure to pay benefits under the “any occupation” definition. This case highlights a claimant’s remedies when a claims administrator/insurer does not follow the applicable ERISA deadlines. It is nice to see the courts protecting claimants when insurers such as MetLife blatantly violate the applicable ERISA and Department of Labor deadlines.
In an ERISA Case, What Actions Will Reduce the Level of Discretion Afforded the Claims Administrator/Insurer?
This article continues our series of articles answering basic questions about insurance law and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (commonly referred to as “ERISA”). This one addresses: In a lawsuit governed by ERISA, what actions taken by the claims administrator (usually an insurance company such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield or CIGNA) will reduce the level of discretion the court gives the insurance company’s decision when reviewing the decision for an abuse of discretion?
Under ERISA, the court does not necessarily review the claims decision by simply attempting to determine whether the insurance company made the “correct” decision. Instead, the court first looks to see whether the plan documents unambiguously confer discretion for determining eligibility on the claim administrator. If discretionary language is present, the abuse of discretion standard of review applies, and the court is required to give some level of deference to the claim administrator’s decision. However, even if such discretionary language is present, the discretion given the claim administrator’s decision is not absolute. Specifically, courts have ruled that the following acts will reduce the level of discretion give to the claims administrator’s decision:
- Rendering a decision without explanation, construing a plan provision in a way that conflicts with the plain language of the plan or relying on clearly erroneous findings of fact.
- “Hiding the ball” by failing to advise claimants of documents needed to obtain approval of claim and an explanation of why such material or information is necessary, and failing to submit forms to claimant or his doctors that would have elicited the information needed.
- Overstatement of and excessive reliance upon claimant’s activities in the surveillance videos and conducting a paper review rather than an “in-person medical evaluation.”
- Encouraging participant to file for Social Security Disability Insurance and, when benefits are awarded by Social Security Administration, failing to deal with and distinguish the contrary disability decision.
- Failing to obtain a physician’s recommendation and relying on medical reports that are not credible.
- “Tainting” medical file reviewer in the medical review process by giving the reviewer inaccurate negative information regarding the claimant.
- Failing to consult with a health care professional who has appropriate training and experience in the applicable field of medicine.
- Emphasizing a report that favored a denial of benefits while deemphasizing other reports suggesting a contrary conclusion, and failing to provide its independent experts with all of the relevant evidence.
- Failing to provide all bases for its denial and suggesting alternate reasons for denial after the fact, thereby precluding the claimant from responding to that rationale for denial at the administrative level.
- Adding new terms to the Plan, particularly when those terms are both imprecise and impose a higher evidentiary burden on a claimant, such as requiring that disability be proved by “compelling objective” evidence.
These are just a select few of the acts that courts have ruled require that the insurer’s decision not be afforded full discretion. Numerous other actions will also cause a court to review a claim decision with something less than full discretion. For additional information on this and other insurance matters you can visit the FAQ section of our website: www.mslawllp.com.
If you need to consult with an attorney about a possible ERISA or insurance bad faith matter, please contact our office.
Cause of Action Asserted Against Blue Cross for Violation of Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act is Not Preempted by ERISA
In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that ERISA does not preempt causes of action based on unfair insurance practice claims brought under Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act. However, the Court did find that Montana’s so-called “little HIPAA” was preempted by federal HIPAA, which is part of ERISA.
In Fossen v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. October 18, 2011), the Court considered an appeal from a District Court ruling that entered summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross on two causes of action. Plaintiffs – which consisted of three brothers, their corporations and a partnership of the three corporations – sued Blue Cross after the health insurer increased their premiums by over 40%. The lawsuit, filed in state court, alleged two causes of action: violation of Montana Code Annotated § 33-22-526(a) (also known as Montana’s “little HIPAA” statute) and violation of Montana Code Annotated § 33-18-101 (also known as Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act). Plaintiffs alleged that premium increase violated little HIPAA’s prohibition against imposing a “premium or contribution that is greater than the premium or contribution for a similarly situated individual” on account of “any health status-related factor of the individual” and the Unfair Trade Practices Act’s prohibition against “unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and of essentially the same hazard in the amount of premium, policy fees, or rates charged.” The action, filed in state court, was removed to the District Court, which eventually granted Blue Cross’ motion for summary judgment as to all causes of action.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first considered whether ERISA and federal HIPAA preempted state law causes of action based on Montana’s little HIPAA statute and conferred federal jurisdiction over the claim. Applying the two-part test detailed in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), the Ninth Circuit determined the little HIPAA claim was preempted because the same claim could have been brought under the federal HIPAA statute and there was no other independent duty implicated by Blue Cross’ actions. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit advised that:
Because the Fossens’ state HIPAA cause of action could have been brought under ERISA § 502(a), and because that cause of action is identical to and expressly dependent upon ERISA, the district court properly denied the Fossens’ motion to remand and exercised jurisdiction over this case.
Next, the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether ERISA preempts the plaintiffs’ statutory unfair insurance practice claim, considering both express preemption under ERISA § 514 (29 U.S.C. § 1144) and conflict preemption under ERISA § 502 (29 U.S.C. § 1132). With respect to express preemption, the court applied the two-part test detailed in Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) and determined that because statute is both “specifically directly toward entities engaged in insurance” and substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured” it is exempt from express preemption.
As to conflict preemption, the court again applied Davila, and determined that the unfair insurance practice claim was not preempted by ERISA because it sought relief (i.e., restitution) that was consistent with ERISA’s enforcement scheme, but that no provision of ERISA expressly guarantees the same rights as the statute.
Also, the unfair insurance practices statute creates a right that is separate from and could not possibly be remedied under ERISA. Whereas HIPAA (both the state and federal versions) prohibits plans and their insurers from charging different premiums on account of “health status-related factor[s],” 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(1); Mont. Code Ann. § 33-22-526(2)(a), the unfair insurance practices statute applies more broadly to bar “any unfair discrimination” with respect to premiums, Mont. Code Ann. § 33-18-206(2) (emphasis added); see, e.g., McCarter v. Glacier Gen. Assurance Co., 546 P.2d 249, 251 (Mont. 1976). Because these statutes are not identical in scope (as is the case with the state and federal HIPAA provisions), they are not conflict preempted.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded this claim for further consideration of the plaintiffs’ allegations that Blue Cross violated Montana’s Unfair Trade Practices Act.
