ERISA Archives - Page 32 of 56 - McKennon Law Group

Breach of Fiduciary Duty under ERISA: Making the Insurer or Plan Administrator Responsible for their actions towards a Plan’s Participants and Beneficiaries

In a previous blog, we addressed the doctrines of equitable estoppel and waiver when the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) governs their insurance or pension plan. As we explained, both doctrines provide an insured with methods of forcing an insurance company to honor its word and previous conduct. However, insureds often have difficulty invoking the doctrines. ERISA governs a wide variety of plans that provide life insurance, disability insurance, accidental death and dismemberment insurance and pension benefits. Given the challenges of invoking equitable estoppel and waiver in the ERISA context, do plan participants and their beneficiaries have other ERISA specific tools to force insurers to honor their word and previous conduct? Luckily, they do. A lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty can sometimes achieve nearly identical results as waiver and equitable estoppel, but with less difficulty.

ERISA provides for various equitable remedies, including surcharge. See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 441 (2011). Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA authorizes plan participants and beneficiaries to seek equitable relief for ERISA violations. The Supreme Court examined this provision in Amara, supra. The Amara court’s interpretation of Section 502(a)(3) provides courts with broad powers to help insureds with problematic plan and claims administrators (normally employers and insurers).

In Amara, several CIGNA employees sued CIGNA for altering the CIGNA Pension Plan. Before the alteration, the pension plan had provided employees with a calculated annuity based on preretirement salary and length of service. The new pension plan provided a lump sum cash balance based on a defined annual contribution from CIGNA. The employees claimed that the new plan provided them with less generous benefits. They also asserted that CIGNA had not given them proper notice of the changes.

CIGNA first notified the employees of the change to the pension plan in a November 1997 newsletter. In the newsletter, CIGNA explained that the new plan would be an account balance system. The newsletter stated that CIGNA would explain the new plan at some undetermined date in 1998, but that the new plan would take effect on January 1, 1998. To employees who were already entitled to pension benefits, the new plan gave the employees a lump sum value for their years of service, discounted to its present value.

The employees sued CIGNA. The district court determined that the initial descriptions of the new plan misled CIGNA’s employees and was incomplete. The November 1997 statement claimed that the new plan would “significantly enhance” the retirement benefits program and would improve retirement benefits. The plan was to provide the “same benefit security” but with “steadier benefit growth.” Id. at 428. CIGNA also claimed that it would not benefit from any savings by implementing the new plan. The district court found all of these statements to be false and violations of provisions of ERISA that require a plan administrator to provide accurate and comprehensive statements such that the average plan participant understands their rights under a plan.

The district court held that ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) provided it with the legal authority to reform the plan for the benefit of the employees. Section 502(a)(1)(B) provides that a plan participant can bring an action to recover benefits due under an ERISA plan. The district court modified various portions of CIGNA’s new pension plan to provide the employees with the benefits to which it held they were entitled.

The court considered relying upon ERISA Section 502(a)(3) for its authority to modify the pension plan, but concluded that, under then Supreme Court precedent, Section 502(a)(3) did not provide the necessary authority. Section 502(a)(3) explains that a claim may be brought:

by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.

CIGNA appealed the district court’s ruling. The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling in a summary opinion. CIGNA petitioned the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the petition.

The Supreme Court first analyzed Section 502(a)(1)(B). It determined that, in fact, Section 502(a)(1)(B) did not provide a district court with the authority to alter a plan. However, the Supreme Court determined that section 502(a)(3) provided the necessary authority. The Supreme Court explained that, “appropriate equitable relief” means the traditional equitable powers of a court. Courts’ traditional equitable powers included special remedies against trust fiduciaries who fail to properly administer a trust. ERISA plans are treated as trusts. As such, the current matter before the Supreme Court was one that traditionally involved an equitable suit against a trust’s administrator. A court’s equitable powers include such remedies as injunctions, reformation of contracts, equitable estoppel and equitable surcharge. Surcharge is the “power to provide relief in the form of monetary ‘compensation’ for a loss resulting from a trustee’s breach of duty, or to prevent the trustee’s unjust enrichment.” Id. at 441. The Supreme Court concluded that section 502(a)(3) provided the necessary authority for the district court’s actions. See id. at 441-42.

The Supreme Court then addressed what standard would apply to a district court’s invocation of its equitable powers. ERISA does not provide a standard. The Supreme Court noted that only certain remedies traditionally required detrimental reliance, the reliance on a party’s assertions to the suing party’s detriment. For example, detrimental reliance is an element of equitable estoppel, but not the reformation of a contract or surcharge.

The Supreme Court determined that to establish surcharge, a party need establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plan beneficiary suffered actual harm due to a fiduciary’s breach of their duties. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for further proceedings.

As we previously noted, insureds have difficulty invoking the doctrines of equitable estoppel and waiver. However, that does not mean that insureds lack recourse against an insurer’s misconduct. An insurer’s actions may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. If so, the insured may have a much simpler time establishing the insurer’s impropriety in court via a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Los Angeles Daily Journal Publishes Article on October 26, 2018 by Robert McKennon Entitled “Court says insurer can’t dodge coverage through ‘technical escape hatch’”

In the October 26, 2018 issue of the Los Angeles Daily Journal, the Daily Journal published an article written by the McKennon Law Group’s Robert J. McKennon. The article addresses a recent case by the California Court of Appeal, which held that the notice-prejudice rule precluded the denial of life insurance benefits based upon the insured’s failure to give timely notice of disability as required under a disability premium waiver provision in the life insurance policy. Insurers often attempt to argue that a technical violation of the notice requirements voids their claim where there exists no prejudice to them. This recent opinion helps to reinforce the notice-prejudice rule in California and helps to protect insureds.

This article is posted with the permission of the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

Court says insurer can’t dodge coverage through ‘technical escape hatch’

A recent Court of Appeal opinion said the notice-prejudice rule precluded the denial of life insurance benefits based upon the insured’s failure to give timely notice of disability as required under a disability premium waiver provision in the life insurance policy.

By Robert J. McKennon

Most first-party insurance policies, including life insurance, disability insurance, property insurance and liability insurance policies, require that an insured policyholder provide notice of a claim within a specified period of time, typically, “as soon as practicable,” “during the Elimination Period” or a similar formulation. See e.g. Ins. Code Section 10350.7 (requirement in disability policies). With respect to liability insurance policies, notice of a claim is required in both claims-made and occurrence policies. Notice generally must be given within a “reasonable time” or within a specified period. Insurance policies often specify that timely reporting of claims is a condition precedent to coverage.

In the case of claims-made policies, the requirement is considered a fundamental element of the insurance contract, and it typically is included in the policy’s insuring agreement. Failure to provide timely notice — especially failure to provide notice within the policy period or grace period of a claims-made policy — can result in a loss of coverage regardless of whether the insurer is prejudiced by the delay in giving notice.

This rule is different in occurrence policies and life and disability insurance policies. But even where a policy specifies that timely notice is a condition precedent to coverage, a policyholder-friendly rule known as the “notice-prejudice rule” has been adopted by the California courts. The rule provides that unless an insurer can demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice from late notice of a claim, the insured’s failure to provide timely notice will not defeat coverage. See, e.g., Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 141-43 (1970); Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Essex Insurance Co., 98 Cal. App. 4th 86, 97 (2002); Root v. American Equity Specialty Insurance Co., 130 Cal. App. 4th 926, 936 (2005).

In both first- and third-party cases, in the absence of prejudice from the delay, an insurer generally may not refuse a claim solely because of delayed notice from the insured: “(T)hough an insurer may assert a defense based upon an alleged breach of the notice requirements of the policy, the breach cannot be a valid defense unless the insurer was substantially prejudiced thereby.” See Downey Saving & Loan Ass’n v. Ohio Casualty. Insurance Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1089 (1987) (emphasis added).

Further, the burden is on the insurer to prove actual and substantial prejudice: “An insured’s failure to comply with the notice or claims provisions in an insurance policy will not excuse the insurer’s obligations under the policy unless the insurer proves it was substantially prejudiced by the late notice …. Prejudice is not presumed from delayed notice alone …. The insurer must show actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice.” See Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Parks, 170 Cal. App. 4th 992, 1003-1004 (2009) (internal quotes and citations omitted).

In Lat v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 2018 DJDAR 10235 (Oct. 18, 2018), the California Court of Appeal held that the notice-prejudice rule precluded the denial of life insurance benefits based upon the insured’s failure to give timely notice of disability as required under a disability premium waiver provision in the life insurance policy.

In December 1993, Maria Carada purchased an “occurrence” flexible premium universal life insurance policy from Farmers. The policy contained a “Waiver of Deduction Rider” under which Farmers agreed “waive the monthly deductions due after the start of and during [Carada’s] continued total disability,” if she provided Farmers with timely written notice and proof of her disability. The rider provided that Farmers needed to receive written notice of disability during the period of disability “unless it can be shown that notice was given as soon as reasonably possible.” The rider “will end when,” among other events, “the policy ends.”

In August 2012, Carada was diagnosed with cancer and became disabled. Carada did not pay the premiums due under the policy while she was disabled. On July 23, 2013, Farmers informed her that the policy had lapsed due to her failure to pay premiums. In August 2013, Carada contacted the insurance agent who had sold her the policy and advised the agent of her illness and disability and asked if the policy could be reinstated. The agent informed a Farmers representative that Carada was dying of cancer and asked if the policy could be reinstated. The representative told the agent that the policy had lapsed and could not be reinstated. The agent relayed this information to Carada. Carada died on Sept. 23, 2013.

Thereafter, the beneficiaries under the policy contacted Farmers to file a claim for the policy’s death benefits. Farmers told the beneficiaries they were not entitled to receive death benefits due to the lapse of the policy. The beneficiaries then sued Farmers alleging causes of action against Farmers for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of its agent.

Farmers moved for summary judgment, claiming that once the policy lapsed, the rider ended and could not be invoked by the policy’s beneficiaries. The trial court granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment, and the beneficiaries appealed the ruling. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Farmers was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. The court found Farmers’ argument, that a lapse of the policy terminated the rider and termination of the rider precluded the beneficiaries’ claim, to be circular. The court determined that under application of the notice-prejudice rule, Farmers must prove that it suffered actual prejudice from the delayed notice of Carada’s disability, and Farmers failed to assert or prove it was prejudiced by the delayed notice. The court explained that if “Farmers had provided that benefit, Carada’s policy would have been in force at the time of her death. Indeed, the only reason Farmers terminated Carada’s policy was that it applied the deductions it had promised Carada it would waive.”

The court rejected Farmer’s analogy to claims-made policies, which are not subject to the notice-prejudice rule, stating that the insured’s policy “is an occurrence policy as to coverage for her disability as well as coverage for her death. Applying the notice-prejudice rule in this instance would not, therefore, transform a claims made and reported policy into an occurrence policy or … effectively rewrite the contract between the parties.” The court concluded that applying the rule would serve the purpose of preventing an insurance company from shielding itself from its contractual obligations through “a technical escape hatch.”

It is always best to provide notice of a claim or relevant event to an insurance company as soon as possible. However, it is not always possible for insureds to provide timely notice. The notice-prejudice rule allows insureds to fairly access their often much needed policy benefits in the face of insurer arguments that a technical violation of the notice requirements voids their claim where there exists no prejudice to them. The Lat case is thus a welcome addition to the notice-prejudice rule jurisprudence in California.

Robert J. McKennon is a shareholder of McKennon Law Group PC in its Newport Beach office. His practice specializes in representing policyholders in life, health and disability insurance, insurance bad faith, ERISA and unfair business practices litigation. He can be reached at (949) 387-9595 or rm@mckennonlawgroup.com. His firm’s California Insurance Litigation Blog can be found at mslawllp.com.

Waiver and Estoppel in the Ninth Circuit Post Salyers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

Waiver and equitable estoppel serve as some of the legal systems’ fundamental checks on the fairness of a party’s actions. Both doctrines serve to prevent an individuals and insurers from performing actions contradictory to what they have previously guaranteed or established via their conduct. “A waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a right or when that party’s acts are so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished.” Salyers v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 871 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Equitable estoppel “holds the [individual] to what it had promised and operates to place the person entitled to its benefit in the same position he would have been in had the representations been true.” Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). Often times, an insurer makes a declaration to an insured only for the insurer to then change its position to the insured’s detriment. This occurs in a variety of contexts such as life insurance, accidental death or dismemberment insurance and disability insurance. In Salyers v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 871 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed waiver in the context of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) and it has become one of the most important cases dealing with waiver and estoppel issues in ERISA employee benefit area.

In Salyers, the Ninth Circuit found an insurer liable for a $250,000 life insurance policy, despite the insured’s failure to provide evidence of insurability to the insurer, as required by the policy. Susan Salyers worked as a nurse at Providence Health & Services. Providence provided life insurance to its employees through a plan sponsored by MetLife. The insurance was governed by ERISA. MetLife’s Summary Plan Description provided that, for a dependent to be eligible for life insurance coverage, the dependent must submit evidence of insurability in the form of a “Statement of Health” for elected coverage over $50,000. In 2013, Ms. Salyers elected a total of $40,000 in coverage, $20,000 for herself and $20,000 for her dependent. As the result of an administrative error, Providence’s internal records showed Ms. Salyers and her dependent as having coverage of $500,000. Neither Metlife nor Providence corrected the error or requested a statement of health. Providence deducted premiums for $500,000 in coverage. In the 2014 open enrollment period, Ms. Salyers elected $250,000 in coverage for her dependent, and, again, neither Providence nor MetLife requested a Statement of Health.

Ms. Salyers’ dependent passed away. MetLife processed the claim but issued only $30,000 in death benefits. It asserted that Ms. Salyers never submitted a “Statement of Health” and, therefore, Ms. Salyers could only receive the lesser amount. On administrative appeal, MetLife continued to deny coverage asserting that “its receipt of premiums did not create coverage” under the plan. Id. at 937.

Ms. Salyers filed suit arguing that MetLife was estopped from contesting coverage and, in the alternative, had waived the evidence of insurability requirement. The district court found in favor of MetLife, determining that Ms. Salyers had failed to meet the burden of establishing coverage via evidence of insurability. Ms. Salyers appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed based on MetLife’s waiver through acceptance of premium payments by Providence, acting as MetLife’s agent in “collecting, tracking and identifying inconsistencies with the evidence of insurability requirement.” Id. at 941. The Ninth Circuit explained that “Courts have applied the waiver doctrine in ERISA cases when an insurer accepted premium payments with knowledge that the insured did not meet certain requirements of the insurance policy.” Id. at 939. MetLife was liable because of Providence’s apparent and implied authority to collect evidence of insurability on MetLife’s behalf. Because Providence failed to properly collect evidence of insurability for Ms. Salyers’ dependent, MetLife waived the right to enforce the Statement of Health requirement. Id. at 938-41. In footnote 5, the Salyers court noted that:

Generally, “[t]he doctrine of waiver looks to the act, or the consequences of the act, of one side only, in contrast to the doctrine of estoppel, which is applicable where the conduct of one side has induced the other to take such a position that it would be injured if the first should be permitted to repudiate its acts.” Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1559 (9th Cir. 1991)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We are mindful, however, of our previous statement that “in the insurance context, the distinction between waiver and estoppel has been blurred . . . . [I]t is consistent with ERISA to require an element of detrimental reliance or some misconduct on the part of the insurance plan before finding that it has affirmatively waived a limitation defense.” Gordon v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP Grp. Long Term Disability Plan, 749 F.3d 746, 752-53 (9th Cir. 2014)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Assuming, without deciding, that our holding inGordonapplies beyond the waiver of a statute of limitations defense at issue in that case, the record reflects that Salyers detrimentally relied on Providence and MetLife’s conduct, presumably by not buying other insurance. In a letter to Salyers, MetLife admits that “it appears that Ms. Salyers detrimentally relied on having Dependent Life Insurance great[er] than $30,000.”

Id. at 941, n.5.

Since Salyers, district courts do not appear to have placed much emphasis on footnote 5. For example, in Cohorst v. Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky, Inc., 2017 WL 6343592 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2017), a case which cited to Salyers, Aubrey Cohorst brought an action under ERISA against Anthem Health Plans of Kentucky, Inc. (“Anthem”). The underlying dispute involved Anthem’s denial of coverage for Ms. Cohorst’s artificial disc replacement surgery, which required the use of a “Mobi-C” device. Ms. Cohorst’s doctor determined that the surgery was medically necessary and sought Anthem’s prior approval. In the initial approval process, Anthem confirmed its approval of the surgery, but did not specify the medical device that would be used. Anthem’s internal documents mirrored its initial approval, describing the surgery as “medical necessary” and meeting “criteria guidelines.” See id. at *1-3.

When Ms. Cohorst’s physician contacted Anthem to confirm which medical device had been approved for surgery, Anthem told the doctor it approved the “Pro Disc-C” and not the “Mobi-C.” Shortly after this conversation, Anthem created a new reference number allegedly based on the request to use the “Mobi-C” device and overturned its original approval, finding the procedure to be “Experimental” or “Investigative” and thus not medically necessary under the terms of the plan. Ultimately, Ms. Cohorst underwent the surgery and Anthem refused to cover its costs.

Ms. Cohorst sued Anthem. Under a de novo standard of review, the court evaluated the plan and the relevant exclusionary language. The court determined that the procedure fell within the exclusion. Despite this, the District Court still found in favor of Ms. Cohorst based on a theory of waiver. Id. at *10. Emphasizing Anthem’s inconsistent behavior, the court held that Anthem waived its right to assert the exclusion when it first approved the surgery as medically necessary. Id. The court explained that Anthem had waived its right to deny Ms. Cohort’s claim because it initially approved her surgery, albeit with a “Pro Disc-C” device. The court explained that waiver occurs when “a party intentionally relinquishes a right” or “when that party’s acts are so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished.” Id. (citing Salyers, 871 F.3d at 938). The court reasoned that Anthem was fully aware of Ms. Cohorst’s medical condition when it initially approved the surgery and it was only after Dr. Bray appealed Anthem’s decision regarding the type of device to be used in the surgery that Anthem suddenly decided to completely reverse its prior authorization and deny Ms. Cohorst’s entire claim. The court found that because there was no new information regarding Plaintiff’s prior condition or any change in its medical policy, Anthem waived its right to rely on the exclusion that was available to it when it provided its initial approval. Id. at 10.

Of interest, the court did not analyze the case in terms of detrimental reliance. Instead, the court performed a standard waiver analysis, like it would for a case not involving ERISA.

Footnote 5 of Salyers raises another question. Has there been any change in how courts apply promissory estoppel in the ERISA context? Salyers is only a year old, but it appears that Salyers has not significantly altered how district courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

As explained in Gabriel v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2014), a Ninth Circuit case that predates Salyers, to establish equitable estoppel, a party must establish “(1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former’s conduct to his injury.” To assert a claim for equitable estoppel under ERISA, additional requirements must be met. “Accordingly, to maintain a federal equitable estoppel claim in the ERISA context, the party asserting estoppel must not only meet the traditional equitable estoppel requirements, but must also allege: (1) extraordinary circumstances; (2) that the provisions of the plan at issue were ambiguous such that reasonable persons could disagree as to their meaning or effect; and (3) that the representations made about the plan were an interpretation of the plan, not an amendment or modification of the plan.” Id. at 956 (internal quotations omitted).

Post Salyers, some district courts in the Ninth Circuit still use this same test listed in Gabriel. See Spies v. Life Ins. Co. of N.A., 312 F.Supp.3d 805, 812-13 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Meakin v. California Field Ironworkers Pension Trust, 2018 WL 405009, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2018); O’Rouke v. Northern California Elec. Workers Pension Plan, 2017 WL 5000335, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2017); Polevich v. Tokio Marine Pac. Ins. Ltd., 2018 WL 4356583, at *9-10 (D. Guam Sept. 13, 2018); Berman v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 2018 WL 732667, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018).

Berman v. Microchip Technology Inc., 2018 WL 732667 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2018), provides a good example of how estoppel can apply in the ERISA context. In Berman, a group of former Atmel employees sued their employer over alleged violations of a severance benefits plan arising under ERISA. The employer created the severance benefits plan due to uncertainty surrounding the employer’s future and its attempts to secure a merger partner. The plan was outlined in a series of letters to the employees. The letters explained that the plan would terminate on November 1, 2015 “unless an Initial Triggering Event . . . occurred prior to November 1, 2015, in which event the [Atmel Plan] will remain in effect for 18 (eighteen) months following that Initial Triggering Event.” Id. at *1. Initial triggering event was defined as “enter[ing] into a definitive agreement . . . on or before November 1, 2015, that will result in a Change of Control of the Company.” The plan benefits would only be provided if a change of control occurred and the employees were terminated without cause within 18 months of the triggering event.

Atmel and a company called Dialog Semiconductor PLC executed and announced a formal merger agreement before November 1, 2015. Before the closing date of the Dialog merger, Atmel and Microchip entered into merger negotiations. Atmel withdrew from the agreement with Dialog and entered into an agreement with and became a wholly owned subsidiary of Microchip. When communicating with its employees, Atmel and Microchip explained that the plan would still apply even if the deal with Microchip, as opposed to Dialog, was completed.

Subsequently, Microchip failed to honor the plan. Several terminated employees sued to obtain their severance benefits under the plan. Microchip moved to dismiss the complaint. One of the plaintiffs’ arguments relied on equitable estoppel. The court relied on the standard Gabriel test. See id. at *14. Defendants argued that the plan was not ambiguous and the circumstances failed the extraordinary circumstances prong of the test. The court did not agree with the defendants. It stated:

First, the Court is satisfied, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ assertions that the provisions of the Atmel Plan are unambiguous, that reasonable parties could disagree as to whether the Plan required the Initial Triggering Event and the Change of Control to involve the same merger partner—particularly at the motion to dismiss stage, and particularly since that interpretation is one of the primary disputes in this case. Second, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege detrimental reliance on an oral, material misrepresentation of that ambiguity by Defendants.

Id. at *15. The court denied Microchip’s motion insofar as it related to the employees’ claim for equitable estoppel. See id.

In the ERISA context, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel can be difficult to invoke. However, sometimes, an insurer makes a critical mistake and must honor its word. Whereas Salyers may be an indication of a gradual change in the doctrine, the change has not yet been firmly established. District courts still rely on the traditional forms of waiver and equitable estoppel. It is quite possible that the foundation for a shift in the doctrines is being laid, but only time will tell if that is the case.

In the next article, we will discuss the similar claims for breach of fiduciary duty and surcharge, which are often easier to prove and prove similar and very satisfying remedies for an ERISA plaintiff/claimant.

McKennon Law Group PC Insurance Litigation Blog Ranked as Top 50 Insurance Law Blog in the U.S.

On September 21, 2018, Feedspot created a list of the Top 50 Insurance Law Blogs, News Websites and Newsletters to Follow in 2018. McKennon Law Group PC | Insurance Litigation Blog was selected by the panelists at Feedspot as one of the Top 50 Insurance Law Blogs and was selected the 13^th overall Law Blog among thousands on the internet. Feedspot ranked the Insurance Law Blogs on the web using Google reputation and search ranking, influence and popularity on social media, quality and consistency of posts and Feedspot’s own editorial team and expert review. The article is posted below:

This article is posted with the permission of Feedpost. Sep. 21, 2018.

<https://blog.feedspot.com/insurance_law_blogs/>

Insurance Company Bias in ERISA Cases: Hartford’s History of Bias and Discovery of an Insurer’s Biased Claims Administration Process

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), a 1974 federal law, sets minimum standards for many employee benefit plans and serves to provide protection for individuals in these plans. Discovery in ERISA cases is often limited because the statute’s primary goal is to provide inexpensive and expeditious resolution to employee benefit claims. District courts are generally limited to the administrative record unless a so-called structural conflict of interest exists. Considering that insurers make benefit determinations on life, health and disability insurance claims and profit when an adverse decision is made, this scenario creates an inherent conflict of interest whenever an insurer administers a claim.

Courts find that a conflict of interest exists where the “entity that administers the plan, such as an employer or an insurance company, both determines whether an employee is eligible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pocket.” Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008). Where this conflict of interest exists, the plaintiff may be entitled to discovery outside of the administrative record to determine the “nature, extent, and effect” the conflict may have had on the decision-making process. Burke v. Pitney Bowes Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 554 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) quoting Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 970 (9th Cir. 2006).

In Black v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 2018 WL 3872113 (D. Or. Aug. 14, 2018), the court considered the history of bias of Hartford Life Insurance Company (“Hartford”), a leading long-term and short-term disability insurance provider, in deciding whether to allow discovery of its history of biased claims administration. In its ruling, the court found Hartford had a history of biased claims administration based on its litigation history and allowed discovery into this area.

The plaintiff, David Black (“Black”), was employed by DMX Music as a customer service representative. He was diagnosed with Atypical Parkinson’s Disease and obtained Long Term Disability (“LTD”) benefits beginning in December 2005. Black’s LTD policy was insured by Hartford, which was responsible for determining the plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits and for paying benefit awards. He was granted an initial 24 months of LTD benefits based on his inability to perform the material duties of his “own occupation.” After the 24-month period ended, Black continued to receive benefits under the more stringent “any occupation” standard for approximately nine years. See id. at *1.

On November 20, 2015, Defendant Hartford’s Special Investigation Unit (“SIU”) investigated Black’s LTD claim based on online information that Black had started a business. Hartford hired a third-party vendor to conduct surveillance of Black, which showed him walking with a cane, using public transportation, going to the bank, getting his hair cut, shopping and carrying groceries. Hartford also discovered a YouTube video of Black playing in a band in May 2014. The SIU scheduled an interview with Black, which was conducted in March 2016 and hired a neurologist to examine him in June 2016. Based on the neurologist’s examination and review of Hartford’s surveillance footage, he concluded that Black did not have Atypical Parkinson’s disease. See id.

On August 31, 2016, Hartford wrote a letter to Black informing him his LTD benefits had been terminated. Black appealed, which was denied by Hartford. After Hartford’s denial of the plaintiff’s appeal, Black brought suit alleging that Hartford abused its discretion under ERISA when it decided to terminate his LTD benefits claim. Black then served discovery on Hartford and then filed a discovery motion to compel production, seeking three categories of documents: Hartford’s relationships with vendors HUB Enterprises (“HUB”), MES Solutions and/or MES Group (“MES”) and its neurologist, Dr. Robert Egan. Black asserted these areas of discovery would reveal a history of biased claims administration. See id. at *2.

The court noted that permitting “conflict” discovery is well within the discretion of the court and the Ninth Circuit has not endorsed imposing a threshold burden of production on the plaintiff before permitting discovery. See id., citing Burke v. Pitney Bowes Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 544 F.3d 1016, 1028 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2008). The court found that in other ERISA cases within the Ninth Circuit, Hartford has used HUB and MES several times to conduct biased investigations. See id.

For example, in Hertz v. Hartford Life & Accessories Insurance Co., 991 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1127 (D. Nev. 2014), Hartford hired HUB to conduct surveillance of the plaintiff in that case. There, the court recognized that Hartford knew its vendors had financial incentives to produce reports that would justify denying benefits. The district court in Hertz granted summary judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, concluding that Hartford’s conflict of interest improperly motivated its benefits decision. Id. at 1143. Similarly, in Caplan v. CAN Financial Corp., 544 F.Supp.2d 984, 991-93 (N.D. Cal. 2008), the Northern District of California considered Hartford’s reliance on a vendor it knew was incentivized to produce biased reports in order to maintain its financial relationship with Hartford. Likewise, a Central District of California court considered Hartford’s “well-established relationship” with MES, noting the increase over time in payments and LTD claim referrals from Hartford to MES. See Black, 2018 WL 3872113 at *2; Kurth v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

In the Black case, the court thus found that Hartford operated under a conflict of interest and had a history of biased claims administration. The court was ultimately persuaded by the fact that Hartford used the same vendors as were used in Hertz, Caplan and Kurth and exercised its discretion to allow Black to obtain the discover of Hartford’s financial relationship with its vendors. Black, 2018 WL 3872113 at *3.

The court then considered discovery regarding the performance and evaluation of six Hartford employees involved in terminating Black’s LTD benefits claim. The court noted that whether or not the performance of the employees involved was measured by reference to their ability to deny or terminate LTD claims directly related to whether Hartford’s conflict of interest biased its decision-making process. In Hertz, Hartford’s employees were “acutely aware” that Hartford evaluated them on that basis. Black, 2018 WL 3872113 at *3 citing Hertz, 991 F.Supp.2d at 1134. Evidence produced in that case showed the investigator responsible for terminating Hertz’s claim was evaluated based on her ability to close claims. Another district court found that Hartford’s performance reviews “may reveal a structural incentive for individual claims adjustors to deny disability claims.” Stout v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 11-6186 CW JSC, 2012 WL 4464605, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2012). The court found that Black’s requests were proportional with the needs of the case and that Black was entitled to discovery of performance evaluations and other incentive-related documents. The court reasoned that such documents have been used by other courts in similar cases as evidence of biased decision-making process. Black, 2018 WL 3872113 at *4.

Conclusion

When dealing with an insurer during an adverse claim decision, it may feel like the company does not have your best interests at heart. Because we litigate often against insurers who deny disability, life and health insurance claims, we know this to be true. While ERISA helps to set guidelines to protect beneficiaries, insurers like Hartford oftentimes overstep these bounds to benefit financially. The Black opinion helps to shed light on the ways insurers administer claims and allow financial bias to permeate their claims decisions. Insurers like Hartford hire biased vendors to render an adverse decision or incentivize employees of the insurers in an attempt to deny benefit claims. Discovery of this evidence may be helpful to determine whether the administrator abused its discretion when it made the benefits decision.

McKennon Law Group PC’s Trial Victory Included in Los Angeles Daily Journal’s September 21, 2018 List of Top Verdicts & Settlements

In the September 21, 2018 issue of the Los Angeles Daily Journal, the Daily Journal published a list of its top “Verdicts & Settlements,” which included the McKennon Law Group’s case of Brian Wright v. AON Hewitt Absence Management LLC, et al. The judgment in Mr. Wright’s favor was rated as the third highest award of damages for a plaintiff for the period of time covered. The McKennon Law Group PC represented Mr. Wright in a dispute over the payment of short-term and long-term disability benefits. We won this ERISA case at trial and our client was awarded all of his disability insurance benefits, attorney’s fees, costs and interest. The list includes a summary of the case. To review the article, take a look at the blog, here.

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