ERISA - Surcharge Archives - McKennon Law Group

Second Circuit Finds Plaintiff Properly Plead Theories of Equitable Estoppel, Surcharge, Reformation and Breach of Fiduciary Duties to Hold Plan Administrator to Promise After Its Clerical Error Provided Over 50x Policy Value

Big, bureaucratic insurance companies and plan administrators can often mistakenly calculate benefits or provide incorrect accountings to insureds. These mistakes can become especially pronounced over time where insureds rely upon benefit accountings and representations of coverage to plan for their financial future and to decide whether to purchase insurance. With the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011), the Court made clear that the equitable remedies of estoppel, surcharge, reformation and breach of fiduciary duty could be applied to hold insurance companies and plan administrators accountable in policies governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Despite that decision, it remains particularly difficult for an ERISA claimant to plead equitable estoppel. However, the recent Second Circuit opinion, Sullivan-Mestecky v. Verizon Communications, Inc., — F.3d —-, 2020 WL 2820334 (2d. Cir. 2020), provides clarity and support for this relief such that we may see more equitable estoppel claims that are successful under ERISA. The decision further supports theories of surcharge, reformation and breach of fiduciary duty in situations where a plan administrator mistakenly calculates benefits and produces values that are in excess of plan terms.

In Sullivan-Mestecky, the Second Circuit considered the doctrines of estoppel, surcharge, reformation and breach of fiduciary duties in relation to an ERISA employee life insurance policy under which the plan administrator had confirmed coverage of over $600,000 for years, only to realize upon claim that it had committed a clerical error and that the actual policy value should have been closer to $11,000. Ultimately, the court found that the beneficiary plaintiff, Kristine Sullivan-Mestecky, had properly plead her Section 502(a)(3) claims for equitable remedies under ERISA, and it reversed the district court’s decision that had found otherwise.

The plaintiff’s mother, Kathleen Sullivan, was employed by the New York Telephone Company, a predecessor entity to Verizon, from 1970 to 1978, during which period her annual income was $18,600. In June 2011, Sullivan contacted the Verizon Benefits Center, which at the time was administered on behalf of Verizon by Aon Hewitt Company. Verizon responded by sending her a “Retirement Enrollment Worksheet,” stating that she was eligible for a life insurance option from the Verizon plan that provided coverage in the amount of $679,000 through Prudential Insurance Company of America. Sullivan followed the instructions on the worksheet and enrolled in this coverage option. After enrolling and designating her daughter Kristine Sullivan-Mestecky as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy, Sullivan received various mailings from Verizon that confirmed the existence and coverage amount of the policy. Sullivan reached out to Verizon and “expressed her understanding, and even surprise, about the extent of her benefits. However, Center representatives repeatedly confirmed the existence and coverage amount of the policy.” Id. at *1-2.

Due to a calculation error, Aon Hewitt had coded Sullivan’s annual $18,600 income as her weekly income, but this mistake was not caught until after she died. Sullivan-Mestecky, understanding herself to be the beneficiary of a generous life insurance policy, allowed her aging mother to live rent-free at her home, covered her mother’s living expenses and paid off her debts, and also took an extended unpaid absence to care for her mother before her death. Of course, Sullivan did not feel that it was necessary to take out an additional life insurance policy due to the generous value of her employer policy.

Based on her mother’s age at the time of her death, Sullivan-Mestecky believed her life insurance policy was worth $582,600. After her mother’s death, Sullivan-Mestecky submitted a claim to Prudential, but Prudential paid only $11,400, which amount it stated was the true value of the policy.

Sullivan-Mestecky disputed the non-payment of her full benefits, and Verizon responded that it “had mistakenly calculated Sullivan’s large coverage amount and thus provided Ms. Sullivan with incorrect information about her life insurance policy.” Id. Sullivan-Mestecky therefore filed suit alleging claims under Sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) of ERISA. On July 7, 2016, the district court granted Verizon’s and Prudential’s motion to dismiss the Section 502(a)(3) claim. On May 16, 2018, the district court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the Section 502(a)(1)(B) claim.

On appeal, the Second Circuit discussed equitable remedies under Section 502(a)(3). The court found that Sullivan-Mestecky could appropriately seek equitable relief under the Supreme Court’s decision in Amara and that her Section 502(a)(3) claim could proceed against Verizon. The court found that Sullivan-Mestecky could proceed against Verizon under the equitable remedies of estoppel, surcharge, reformation and breach of fiduciary duty.

In the Second Circuit, to make a claim for estoppel under Section 502(a)(3), a plaintiff must plausibly allege five elements: “(1) a promise, (2) reliance on that promise, (3) injury caused by the reliance, . . . (4) an injustice if the promise is not enforced, and (5) extraordinary circumstances.” Weinreb v. Hosp. for Joint Diseases Orthopaedic Inst., 404 F.3d 167, 172-73 (2d. Cir. 2005). The Sullivan-Mestecky court examined Verizon’s repeated oral assurances to Sullivan about the value of her life insurance policy in determining whether Sullivan-Mestecky had pled extraordinary circumstances, and it joined the Sixth Circuit in finding that estoppel could be plausibly pled as an appropriate equitable remedy by an ERISA plaintiff who is alleging gross negligence in the absence of intentional inducement. The court found that Sullivan-Mestecky had plausibly pled the five elements required to make an estoppel claim against Verizon, because Verizon had sent Sullivan an enrollment worksheet that indicated that she was eligible for a life insurance policy valued at $679,700, a retirement of confirmation worksheet, a confirmation of coverage on demand letter, a beneficiary confirmation notice and a Form W-2, all of which represented that Verizon was providing Sullivan with a generous life insurance policy. The court found that these written documents constituted and reflected the promise that Sullivan-Mestecky sought to enforce and that she had amply pled reliance on that promise. Sullivan-Mestecky, 2020 WL 2820334, at *5.

In considering the extraordinary-circumstances requirement of ERISA estoppel, the court found that this had been met, based on Verizon’s conduct that it found had amounted to gross negligence. Id. at *6. The court wrote:

Verizon’s agents sent numerous mailings informing and assuring Sullivan that she was entitled to a life insurance policy in the amount of $679,000. She relied on these representations only after diligently and repeatedly confirming their veracity and meaning with the Verizon Benefits Center. On calls with the Verizon Benefits Center, Sullivan expressed her surprise at the stated value of her life insurance policy, effectively alerting Verizon to the fact that it may have miscalculated the value. Not only did Sullivan draw attention to the high coverage figure, but an Aon Hewitt employee flagged the policy amount, writing in an email to a colleague that the amount seemed high and asking if the company’s software was somehow computing the wrong amount. Another Aon Hewitt employee then responded, erroneously, that the amount was correct. Instead of opening an investigation that likely would have uncovered the clerical error that led Sullivan and her daughter to believe that she had procured a generous life insurance policy, Verizon representatives reassured Sullivan that her beneficiary would receive, after the age discount, more than half a million dollars in death benefits. It was only after Sullivan’s death, when the purchase of alternative life insurance to support Sullivan-Mestecky was impossible, that Verizon attempted to correct its clerical error. In contravention of what it had repeatedly and unambiguously represented to Sullivan in writing and on calls, Verizon paid Sullivan-Mestecky a total of $11,400, less than two percent of what Verizon had promised. Verizon’s acts of gross negligence present circumstances far “beyond the ordinary.” The persistence and size of Verizon’s error, notwithstanding the ample inquiry notice provided by Sullivan’s calls to the Verizon Benefits Center, were “remarkable.” We find that Sullivan-Mestecky satisfactorily pled extraordinary circumstances. Id.

The Sullivan-Mestecky court also considered surcharge under Section 502(a)(3) and found that this was dependent upon the plaintiff’s allegation of fiduciary breach, specifically that Verizon failed to act with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use as ERISA requires. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). The court found that she had plausibly pled that Verizon had breached its fiduciary duties through its gross negligence in its management of Sullivan’s life insurance policy by consistently failing to provide complete and accurate information about Sullivan’s status and options in response to her questions about plan terms and/or benefits. Sullivan-Mestecky, 2020 WL 2820334, at *6. The court found that this fiduciary breach was sufficient to support the equitable remedy of surcharge.

Further, the Sullivan-Mestecky court considered the equitable remedy of reformation under Amara, which is described as “[t]he power to reform contracts (as contrasted with the power to enforce contracts as written)” as “a traditional power of an equity court, not a court of law.” The Supreme Court wrote that “equity would reform [a] contract, and enforce it, as reformed, if . . . mistake or fraud were shown.” Amara, 563 U.S. at 440. The Sullivan-Mestecky court wrote that it need not discuss mutual mistake because the plaintiff had adequately pled that Verizon had committed equitable fraud by misrepresenting that Sullivan was entitled to a life insurance policy in the amount of $679,000. As a result of Verizon’s fraudulent representations, the court found that Sullivan had reasonably but mistakenly expected that her beneficiary would receive generous death benefits, and Sullivan-Mestecky thereby adequately pled circumstances that would permit the district court to equitably reform the terms of her plan with Verizon, sufficient to bind Verizon to its fraudulent representations.

Insurance companies and plan administrators typically try to excuse their mistakes that often have the effect of causing tremendous financial disruption for claimants who rely upon them for accurate accountings of their benefits and coverage. As the Sullivan-Mestecky matter shows, an insured could potentially receive a windfall from an insurance company or plan administrator’s mistake, as long as certain elements are met. This case will serve as a useful guidepost for equitable claims under ERISA.

If your insurance company or plan administrator has mishandled or denied your claim, please contact our firm for a free consultation. We have extensive experience handling equitable claims under ERISA.

McBean v. United of Omaha Life: Judge Anello Finds Employer Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Orders Payment of Life Insurance Policies’ Face Value under Equitable Surcharge Theory

McBean v. United of Omaha Life: Judge Anello Finds Employer Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Orders Payment of Life Insurance Policies’ Face Value under Equitable Surcharge Theory

Application of the doctrine of “equitable surcharge” in ERISA has become a very significant theory of recovery for ERISA plan participants in obtaining their life insurance and medical insurance benefits. In a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, McBean v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, 2019 WL 1508456, the ERISA surcharge theory was used to overturn the denial of a life insurance claim, thus salvaging substantial life insurance benefits that would otherwise have been lost through breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation.

In McBean, the Plaintiff won a significant victory in a case involving a claim for life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed plan. The Plaintiff’s mother (“Decedent”) was covered by United of Omaha’s (“United”) Basic Life Insurance Policy and Voluntary Life Insurance Policy (“Policies”). United was the Claims Administrator, and the Plan Administrator/fiduciary was the employer By Referral Only, Inc. (“Referral”). The benefits at issue under the Policies were $43,550.00 and $100,000.00. At the age of 67, the Decedent was diagnosed with breast cancer, and left work on June 9, 2015 to have surgery. She returned to work part-time thereafter, but by August 10, 2016, she had to stop working, and died on August 5, 2017. United accepted the premium payments for the Policies made by Referral up to the date of the Decedent’s death.

According to the Policies, coverage ends “the last day of the month in which … [y]ou are no longer Actively Employed….” To be “Actively Employed” according to the Policies means to work 40 hours or more per week regularly, and to receive “compensation from the Policyholder for work performed for the Policyholder.” Among other provisions involving eligibility and enrollment updates, the Policies required Referral to inform United when an employee’s eligibility status changes, and they contained a conversion provision that allowed the covered employee to apply for an individual policy without providing health information. On February 6, 2017, the Decedent was granted long-term-disability benefits retroactive to September 6, 2015. On August 21, 2017, the Plaintiff (as trustee of his mother’s trust) submitted a claim to United for benefits under the Policies. United denied the claim, responding that the Policies were “not in force at the time of [Decedent’s] death on August 5, 2017” because she was no longer working. The Plaintiff appealed, explaining that Referral’s managing director told the Decedent and her family that the company would ensure payment of the premiums. On December 12, 2017, United affirmed its earlier claim decision that the Decedent was no longer covered when she died, and then it refunded the premiums Referral had paid for the Decedent during her period of ineligibility.

The Plaintiff filed an ERISA lawsuit setting forth a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against United and Referral. The Plaintiff’s first argued that United had waived the “active employment” eligibility requirements (which, on their own, would mean that the Decedent’s coverage had ended in June 2015 for the Voluntary Life Policy and June 2016 for the Basic Life Policy) because it continued to accept premiums even though it knew that the Decedent was not actively employed. The Plaintiff also claimed that United had waived the “written notice” requirements for extension of coverage. However, the court found that such an argument would create coverage where it did not exist in the Policies, and found as well that the Plaintiff had not shown sufficient evidence of “an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of United’s right to require a written request for continued coverage . . . .”

With regard to the Plaintiff’s claim for equitable surcharge under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3) against United for breach of fiduciary duty—a remedy that would provide “compensatory damages for actual harm caused by . . . breach of duty”—Plaintiff argued that United had a duty to develop a system to confirm eligibility before it accepted premiums, rather than waiting until a mistake occurred to implement a system. Citing Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1996), the court rejected that argument, finding that “United had no duty to train or supervise Referral because United did not have the authority to select or remove the plan administrator.” In addition, Referral was responsible for determining eligibility and updating United on which employees should be covered under the Policies.

Referral was also found to be a fiduciary under the policy because it is the plan sponsor and plan administrator, and breach of duty, the court ruled, was indicated by Referral’s misrepresentation to the Decedent that she would continue to have life insurance coverage. That promise was false and material and led to “detrimental reliance by the plaintiff.” In re Computer Scis. Corp. ERISA Litig., 635 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The standard for material misrepresentation involves “a substantial likelihood that it [the misrepresentation] would materially mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed . . . decision.” (Id. At 1141.) With respect to detrimental reliance, that standard was met because the Decedent, trusting in what Referral told her, “lost the opportunity to convert or port her coverage, or obtain coverage she wanted through another channel, such as on the individual market for life insurance.”

It is noteworthy that the court rejected Plaintiff’s claim of derivative liability on the part of United based on Referral being its agent, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff onhis claim against Referral in the amount of the Policies’ combined face value, $143,550.00; it also allowed Plaintiff to file a motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. It appears that Plaintiff’s counsel did not cite important and relevant Ninth Circuit authority that clearly would have made the insurer liable for the acts of the employer (this is why it’s important to hire the best ERISA lawyers in California, the McKennon Law Group PC). Even though the court awarded summary judgment against the employer on all claims but one, that one claim for the value of the life insurance policies under the doctrine of equitable surcharge proved invaluable for the family of the deceased employee.

Ninth Circuit Expands the Availability of Equitable Remedies in ERISA Cases, Approving Surcharge as a Viable Remedy

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985), the courts have grappled with the issue of the extent to which equitable remedies are available under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). One of the most interesting and beneficial for plan participants is the issue of the equitable remedy of surcharge under ERISA. Recently, the Ninth Circuit withdrew an earlier decision regarding the availability of the equitable remedy of surcharge in ERISA, and issued a new ruling consistent with the holdings of other Circuit courts. The new ruling, Gabriel v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, 2014 DJDAR 16590 (9th Cir. 2014), is much more favorable to ERISA claimants and makes clear that surcharge, a form of equitable relief, is available to ERISA claimants under 29 U.S.C. section 1132(a)(3). Further, the Court also set forth the requirements that a claimant must meet to qualify for other forms of equitable relief, including equitable estoppel and reformation.

The specific facts of the Gabriel matter are unimportant, and ultimately the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court was correct in holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to the payment of the pension funds that he sought because his rights to those funds never vested. The Ninth Circuit also remanded one aspect of the case to the District Court, but virtually instructed the lower court to deny that claim as well. However, the ruling is important because, by making the equitable remedy of surcharge available to ERISA claimants, the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits in expanding the rights of ERISA claimants.

In the ruling, the Ninth Circuit explained that in Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011), the United States Supreme Court made it clear that because ERISA section 1132(a)(3) allows a claimant to seek “appropriate equitable relief,” those remedies traditionally viewed as equitable were available.

Thus, for example, a claim of “appropriate equitable relief” may include “the reformation of the terms of the plan, in order to remedy the false or misleading information” provided by a plan fiduciary. The Ninth Circuit then explained:

A plaintiff may obtain reformation based on mistake in two circumstances: “if there is evidence that a mistake of fact or law affected the terms of [a trust] instrument and if there is evidence of the settlor’s true intent”; or (2) “if both parties [to a contract] were mistaken about the content or effect of the contract” and the contract must be reformed “to capture the terms upon which the parties had a meeting of the minds.” Skinner, 673 F.3d at 1166. Under a fraud theory, a plaintiff may obtain reformation when either (1) “[a trust] was procured by wrongful conduct, such as undue influence, duress, or fraud,” or (2) a “party’s assent [to a contract] was induced by the other party’s misrepresentations as to the terms or effect of the contract” and he “was justified in relying on the other party’s misrepresentations.” Id.

Next, the Ninth Circuit explained that equitable estoppel is another form of equitable relief available to ERISA claimants. Under the remedy of equitable estoppel, a fiduciary is held to what it promised and the claimant is entitled to the benefit consistent with that promise. However, in ERISA cases, enforcing equitable estoppel is not as simple as demonstrating that a promise for certain benefits were made; other conditions apply. For example, “a federal equitable estoppel claim in the ERISA context [cannot] contradict written plan provisions.”

Accordingly, a plaintiff may not bring an equitable estoppel claim that “would result in a payment of benefits that would be inconsistent with the written plan,” or would, as a practical matter, result in an amendment or modification of a plan, because such a result “would contradict the writing and amendment requirements of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(1) and (b)(3).”

…

For the same reason, “oral agreements or modifications cannot be used to contradict or supersede the written terms of an ERISA plan.” (Citations omitted.)

In addition, the court explained that in order to meet the traditional equitable estoppel requirements, the ERISA claimant must also demonstrate “(1) extraordinary circumstances; (2) that the provisions of the plan at issue were ambiguous such that reasonable persons could disagree as to their meaning or effect; and (3) that the representations made about the plan were an interpretation of the plan, not an amendment or modification of the plan.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Finally, with respect to the equitable remedy of surcharge, an equitable remedy in which the claimant is placed in the position he or she would have been in but for the fiduciary’s breach of duty, the Ninth Court reversed its previous, now-withdrawn, decision and noted that Amara allows a claimant to obtain relief by surcharge. The Ninth Circuit explained that in order to prevail on a claim surcharge remedy, after Amara, the claimant is not required to show detrimental reliance, only that the plan or claim fiduciary breached its fiduciary duty owed to the injured claimant. In other words, all that is needed is harm and causation.

While the plaintiff in Gabriel may not ultimately obtain the benefits he was seeking, this was another plaintiff-friendly ruling from the Ninth Circuit.

Echague v. Met Life: Equitable Surcharge is an Available Remedy Against Unresponsive Plan Administrators Under ERISA

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) seeks to protect participants in employer-sponsored plans, but lack of adequate communication and transparency is an often an unfortunate byproduct of the insurance industry. The California district court shed light on this issue in Echague v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68642 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2014) by holding an insurer breaches its fiduciary duty when providing insufficient responses and the insured may be entitled to equitable surcharge. Echague is highly beneficial to insureds and beneficiaries, as it warns plan fiduciaries (such as insurers and plan administrators/employers) to think twice before ignoring requests for information, giving incorrect information, or neglecting to provide updates regarding the policies they administer, as their inactions or providing of incorrect information about the plan may open them up to equitable remedies such as equitable surcharge which would allow plan participants to recover the full value of the plan benefits in dispute.

In Echague, Carol Echague (“Mrs. Echague”) opted for a basic life insurance policy and a supplemental life insurance policy worth a total of $440,000 through her employer, Pacific Coast Bankers’ Bank (“PCBB”). The policies were issued as part of a cafeteria-type plan by TriNet Group, Inc. (“TriNet”), the plan administrator and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”), the claims administrator. In January 2011, Mrs. Echague was diagnosed with breast cancer and took medical leave. Mrs. Echague sent TriNet an inquiry stating she did not want her policies to lapse, inquired which policies she needed to pay on her own, and where to send the premium payments. TriNet resent two confusing form letters which did not address that the policies were in danger of lapsing. Following Carol Echague’s death, TriNet notified her husband (“Mr. Echague”), that it submitted a life insurance claim on his behalf to MetLife. This was the first time TriNet informed the Echagues that MetLife was the claims administrator. However, the life insurance policies lapsed due to nonpayment of premiums, and MetLife denied the claim. MetLife also denied Mr. Echague’s appeal, which argued neither he nor his wife ever received notice that the policies were at risk of terminating, or that PCBB ceased premium payments. Subsequently, Mr. Echague sued MetLife, TriNet and PCBB, for benefits under 29 USC section 1132(a)(1)(B) and equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty under 29 USC section 1132(a)(3).

The court granted summary judgment for TriNet, PCBB and MetLife as to Mr. Echague’s first claim for reinstatement of the life insurance benefits under section 1132(a)(1)(B), holding the denial was proper. Here, MetLife did not act with a conflict of interest in denying Mr. Echague’s claim. The only information MetLife needed to issue a decision on the claim was whether premium payments were made to continue the policy, and proof of Mrs. Echague’s death. Here, MetLife already had this information and accordingly, did not need to conduct an investigation or state with specificity what additional information it needed. Finally, TriNet and PCBB were not proper defendants, as MetLife had sole authority to issue denials on the life insurance claims.

However, the court held Mr. Echague presented a different theory under section 1132(a)(3) for breach of fiduciary duty and thus the claim survived. The court explained Mr. Echague’s (a)(1)(B) claim was directed at MetLife for its failure to pay benefits, while his section 1132(a)(3) claim was primarily directed at TriNet for its failure to provide adequate notice and act in a fiduciary manner. TriNet cannot escape liability by claiming MetLife had discretion for claims determination, because TriNet retained responsibility for interpreting the Plan, applying the terms and administering the Plan. As such, TriNet had a duty to deal fairly and honestly with fiduciaries under ERISA by providing complete, thorough and accurate information. Prior to Ms. Echague’s death, the Echagues sent several inquiries to TriNet requesting information on her disability and supplemental policies. TriNet responded by sending form letters that did not provide information relating to Ms. Echague’s life insurance policies. The letters pointed her to an overarching cafeteria plan, a Summary Plan Description which did not provide answers to her questions, and a non-existent employee handbook. TriNet failed to refer the Echagues to the Certificate of Insurance, the only document which describes how to convert or continue life insurance coverage, and explain when the premiums for the policies would end. Therefore, TriNet breached its fiduciary duties because its response failed to provide complete and accurate information to the claimant’s specific questions. Accordingly, the court granted Mr. Echague the face value of the policies under the doctrine of equitable surcharge.

Echague is a clear win for insureds in several ways. First, Echague clarifies that even if an insurer denies a claim on a reasonable basis, insureds may assert breach of fiduciary duty claims. Secondly, the district decision expanded a plan fiduciary’s duty to provide insureds with complete and accurate policy/plan information. The court indicates that insurers must provide specific answers when asked specific questions, and implies a general response referring an insured to a number of documents may be insufficient. In addition, the insurer must provide specific answers even when an insured asks a general question—such as providing Ms. Echague with information pertaining to her life policies when her questions inquired as to all insurance policies. Finally, this court allowed insureds to sue simultaneously for benefits and for breach of fiduciary duty where these claims request alternate relief, distinguishing cases that held to the contrary.

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