Articles Archives - Page 2 of 6 - McKennon Law Group

Cassim v. Allstate Insurance: Attorney’s Fees in Contingency-Fee “Bad Faith” Cases

Since 2004, when the California Supreme Court ruled that a “portion” of contingency attorney’s fees are recoverable in bad-faith insurance cases, plaintiffs and their lawyers have been able to recover attorney’s fees based in part on the specific terms of the contingency-fee retainer agreement. For starters, in order to recover attorney’s fees in these actions, a policyholder must prove that (1) contractual benefits were withheld in bad faith, and (2) reasonable fees were incurred by the policyholder to recover those benefits. However, any attorney’s fees incurred merely to prove the alleged “bad faith” claims are not recoverable at all; only fees incurred to prove actual coverage are recoverable. Cassim v. Allstate Insurance, 33 Cal.4th 780, 811 (2004).

In Cassim, plaintiffs Fareed and Rashida Cassim purchased a home in Palmdale in 1989 and insured the property against loss with Allstate Insurance. In December 1990, a fire (later determined to be arson) caused damage to the home. Although the fire burned only in the master bedroom and kitchen, the extensive heat, smoke and water damage to the rest of the structure rendered the entire home uninhabitable. After plaintiffs proved “bad faith” on the part of Allstate Insurance, a jury awarded plaintiffs a combined $3,594,600 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. The plaintiffs’ attorney had a 40%-contingency-fee agreement.

The Cassim court held that a proper calculation of attorney’s fees requires the trier of fact to determine the percentage of fees attributable to securing just the contract recovery. This formula is based on the percentage of the attorney’s overall efforts devoted to the contractual recovery portion of the case and is divided into three categories: contract claim only, bad-faith claim only, and both claims. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial judge to make the calculation.

Using hypothetical numbers, and assuming a total compensatory award of $1 million, the 40% contingency fee would be $400,000. If the policyholder’s lawyer spent 1,500 total hours on the case and can prove the breakdown as follows: 200 hours on the contract claim only, 800 hours on the bad-faith claim only and 500 hours on both claims, then the trier of fact could, reasonably, conclude that one-half of the hours spent on the joint “contract and bad faith” issues are fairly attributable to the contract; i.e., half of 500 hours, or 250 hours, plus the 200 hours from the contract claim only, would total 30%. That 30% of the total attorney’s fee ($400,000) would be recoverable as well: $120,000 extra paid to the plaintiffs.

However, the Cassim court also cautioned judges to disregard fee agreements designed solely to manipulate the calculation of recoverable costs to the policyholder’s benefit, as have been shown to exist in some cases in the intervening years. For instance, the case of Pulte Home Corporation v. American Safety Indemnity, 14 Cal.App.5th 1086 (2017) disallowed a last-minute modification of a fee agreement from contingency to hourly, as an improper attempt to inflate the attorney’s fee (and punitive damage) award. This case involved the development of two residential housing projects that were built beginning in 2003 and sold between 2005-2006. The various subcontractors were required to name the developer as an “additional insured” on their policies, some of which were issued by American Safety. In 2013, several homeowners sued Pulte for alleged defects in the work performed by the subcontractors who were insured by American Safety. American Safety denied coverage and refused to provide a defense to Pulte because the construction had taken place 10 years prior.

Pulte sued American Safety, and prevailed on the “bad faith” claims, but American Safety then appealed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and punitive damages as violating the dictates set forth in the Cassim case, specifically improperly attempting to inflate the attorney’s fee (and punitive damage) award. Pulte’s lawyer in the bad-faith case originally had entered into a contingency-fee agreement with Pulte, which would have resulted in a fee award of only $371,000 under the Cassim formula, set forth above.

After the trial on bad faith, but before the punitive damage phase, Pulte “modified” the fee agreement to be based on an hourly rate instead and, thereafter, claimed an additional $274,000 in attorney’s fees actually incurred and paid, for a total of $645,000. The trial court disagreed with American Safety’s assertion that the change in the fee agreement was to manipulate the process. After making deductions for fees unrelated to pursuing amounts due under the insurance contract, the trial court awarded Pulte $471,313.52 in attorney’s fees. Based on the one-to-one ratio with attorney’s fees, the trial court also awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal reversed, stating, “We have serious concerns that this change in Pulte’s fee agreement was apparently ‘designed to manipulate the calculation of Brandt fees’ to the plaintiff’s benefit.” Id. at 1132. The court also rejected Pulte’s argument that, because Pulte had actually incurred and paid the hourly fee, that amount must be considered as the proper amount for the attorney-fee award. The court concluded that the judge should have based the attorney-fee award on the agreement in force during the trial and, therefore, remanded the case to recalculate the proper amount of attorney’s fees (and to adjust the punitive damage award, since because it was based on the improper attorney-fee award). Id. at 1133.

The good news for plaintiffs’ attorneys is that any “bad faith” case can be prosecuted under a contingency-fee agreement, based on the Cassim case, and an award of attorney’s fees based on that fee agreement may be possible. California courts continue to define the outlying boundaries for recovering contingency attorney’s fees, but at least there is no question that “reasonable” fees (attributable to proving actual coverage) are recoverable.

McBean v. United of Omaha Life: Judge Anello Finds Employer Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Orders Payment of Life Insurance Policies’ Face Value under Equitable Surcharge Theory

McBean v. United of Omaha Life: Judge Anello Finds Employer Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Orders Payment of Life Insurance Policies’ Face Value under Equitable Surcharge Theory

Application of the doctrine of “equitable surcharge” in ERISA has become a very significant theory of recovery for ERISA plan participants in obtaining their life insurance and medical insurance benefits. In a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, McBean v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, 2019 WL 1508456, the ERISA surcharge theory was used to overturn the denial of a life insurance claim, thus salvaging substantial life insurance benefits that would otherwise have been lost through breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation.

In McBean, the Plaintiff won a significant victory in a case involving a claim for life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed plan. The Plaintiff’s mother (“Decedent”) was covered by United of Omaha’s (“United”) Basic Life Insurance Policy and Voluntary Life Insurance Policy (“Policies”). United was the Claims Administrator, and the Plan Administrator/fiduciary was the employer By Referral Only, Inc. (“Referral”). The benefits at issue under the Policies were $43,550.00 and $100,000.00. At the age of 67, the Decedent was diagnosed with breast cancer, and left work on June 9, 2015 to have surgery. She returned to work part-time thereafter, but by August 10, 2016, she had to stop working, and died on August 5, 2017. United accepted the premium payments for the Policies made by Referral up to the date of the Decedent’s death.

According to the Policies, coverage ends “the last day of the month in which … [y]ou are no longer Actively Employed….” To be “Actively Employed” according to the Policies means to work 40 hours or more per week regularly, and to receive “compensation from the Policyholder for work performed for the Policyholder.” Among other provisions involving eligibility and enrollment updates, the Policies required Referral to inform United when an employee’s eligibility status changes, and they contained a conversion provision that allowed the covered employee to apply for an individual policy without providing health information. On February 6, 2017, the Decedent was granted long-term-disability benefits retroactive to September 6, 2015. On August 21, 2017, the Plaintiff (as trustee of his mother’s trust) submitted a claim to United for benefits under the Policies. United denied the claim, responding that the Policies were “not in force at the time of [Decedent’s] death on August 5, 2017” because she was no longer working. The Plaintiff appealed, explaining that Referral’s managing director told the Decedent and her family that the company would ensure payment of the premiums. On December 12, 2017, United affirmed its earlier claim decision that the Decedent was no longer covered when she died, and then it refunded the premiums Referral had paid for the Decedent during her period of ineligibility.

The Plaintiff filed an ERISA lawsuit setting forth a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against United and Referral. The Plaintiff’s first argued that United had waived the “active employment” eligibility requirements (which, on their own, would mean that the Decedent’s coverage had ended in June 2015 for the Voluntary Life Policy and June 2016 for the Basic Life Policy) because it continued to accept premiums even though it knew that the Decedent was not actively employed. The Plaintiff also claimed that United had waived the “written notice” requirements for extension of coverage. However, the court found that such an argument would create coverage where it did not exist in the Policies, and found as well that the Plaintiff had not shown sufficient evidence of “an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of United’s right to require a written request for continued coverage . . . .”

With regard to the Plaintiff’s claim for equitable surcharge under 29 U.S.C. Section 1132(a)(3) against United for breach of fiduciary duty—a remedy that would provide “compensatory damages for actual harm caused by . . . breach of duty”—Plaintiff argued that United had a duty to develop a system to confirm eligibility before it accepted premiums, rather than waiting until a mistake occurred to implement a system. Citing Fink v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 489, 492 (8th Cir. 1996), the court rejected that argument, finding that “United had no duty to train or supervise Referral because United did not have the authority to select or remove the plan administrator.” In addition, Referral was responsible for determining eligibility and updating United on which employees should be covered under the Policies.

Referral was also found to be a fiduciary under the policy because it is the plan sponsor and plan administrator, and breach of duty, the court ruled, was indicated by Referral’s misrepresentation to the Decedent that she would continue to have life insurance coverage. That promise was false and material and led to “detrimental reliance by the plaintiff.” In re Computer Scis. Corp. ERISA Litig., 635 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1140 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The standard for material misrepresentation involves “a substantial likelihood that it [the misrepresentation] would materially mislead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed . . . decision.” (Id. At 1141.) With respect to detrimental reliance, that standard was met because the Decedent, trusting in what Referral told her, “lost the opportunity to convert or port her coverage, or obtain coverage she wanted through another channel, such as on the individual market for life insurance.”

It is noteworthy that the court rejected Plaintiff’s claim of derivative liability on the part of United based on Referral being its agent, and granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff onhis claim against Referral in the amount of the Policies’ combined face value, $143,550.00; it also allowed Plaintiff to file a motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. It appears that Plaintiff’s counsel did not cite important and relevant Ninth Circuit authority that clearly would have made the insurer liable for the acts of the employer (this is why it’s important to hire the best ERISA lawyers in California, the McKennon Law Group PC). Even though the court awarded summary judgment against the employer on all claims but one, that one claim for the value of the life insurance policies under the doctrine of equitable surcharge proved invaluable for the family of the deceased employee.

In Harlow v. MetLife, Judge Bernal Brings Clarity to Disputes Involving “Reasonable” Attorneys’ Fees Adopting Standards Favorable to ERISA Claimants

The topic of attorneys’ fees has long been of interest to insurance lawyers and clients alike. Recently, the courts have grappled with issues such as: When are attorneys’ fees recoverable? What types of billing practices are reasonable? What are reasonable hourly rates? Attorneys want the assurance that the fees they charge will be deemed “reasonable,” and defendants (the insurance companies) want to know when they can raise defenses to the amount of an attorneys’ fees they may be expected to pay. In this article, we will consider a recent case that has helped bring some clarity to the issue of “reasonable” fees for legal work. Robert J. McKennon of McKennon Law Group PC acted as an expert in this case as to reasonable hourly rates. The court adopted his testimony in full.

In a recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Harlow v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 2019 WL 2265136, the Plaintiff successfully challenged the insurer’s decision to terminate her long-term disability payments. She then moved for attorney’s fees, with each side submitting multiple declarations and exhibits for or against specific amounts and practices. There was no question about the court’s discretionary authority to award reasonable attorneys’ fees in an ERISA case, and case law holds that a court must initially determine whether the plaintiff has “achieved some degree of success on the merits.” Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infinity Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010). That success must go beyond a victory on mere procedural issues or some “trivial” matter. Beyond this test, a court must consider the five factors derived from Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1980). These “Hummell factors” are as follows:

(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith;

(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees;

(3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances;

(4) whether the parties requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and

(5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.

The Harlow court ruled that the Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees, pointing out that MetLife itself made no argument denying the Plaintiff had “achieved success on the merits of her action,” nor cited any “special circumstances” that might have precluded the fee demand. Moreover, the Hummell factors only apply when the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim are still under serious consideration.

The court next addressed what makes an attorney’s fee “reasonable.” A reasonable fee is determined by means of “a hybrid lodestar/multiplier approach.” McElwaine v. US West, Inc., 176 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). A lodestar amount is determined by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by each attorney’s reasonable hourly rate.” Id. This determination notwithstanding, a court would be within its rights to disallow “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” claims. Id. When—as in Harlow—a Plaintiff seeks an award of $184,750 for attorneys’ fees, the issue of “reasonableness” deserves scrutiny. The court first cited case law in favor of looking to “the prevailing market rate for similar services ‘by lawyers of reasonable comparable skill, experience, and reputation.’” Mardirossian v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 457 F.Supp.2d 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2006), citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). The Plaintiff’s counsel charged $400 per hour, a figure she reached upon making partner, while her fellow counsel billed at $700 per hour. The court found these sums reasonable due to the respective attorneys’ long experience with ERISA claims. In support of the Plaintiff’s counsel on this matter of relevant experience, Robert J. McKennon, managing shareholder of The McKennon Law Group PC, submitted evidence via testimony based on his more than thirty years in insurance law and ERISA law, especially in the areas of life, disability and health.

In opposition to MetLife’s assertion that the fees quoted run contrary to “policy considerations” and ERISA’s purpose “to provide inexpensive, expeditious resolution to disputes concerning qualifying employee benefit plans” (citations omitted), the court pointed to the Ninth Circuit’s determination that courts should not arrive at an appropriate rate “by reference to the rates actually charged the prevailing party” but instead “by reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity.” Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2007). With regard to the claim made by MetLife about ERISA’s public policy imperative, the court again cited the Ninth Circuit, which determined that among ERISA’s goals were “protect[ing] employee rights” and “secur[ing] access to federal courts.” Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984). The court found that allowing “reasonable” attorneys’ fees would in fact help clients gain such access. If attorneys cannot charge the prevailing rate, they might be unwilling to take on ERISA clients, which would effectively deprive such clients of access to the courts.

MetLife also made a number of unavailing arguments against the sums charged by the Plaintiff’s counsel. MetLife argued that the hours billed were excessive, duplicative, overly reliant on prefabricated “boilerplate” language, prone to non-itemized block-billing, and inclusive of inappropriate administrative or merely clerical labor. The court’s responses to these concerns testified to the complexity and dynamic quality of the labor involved in lawyering, and affirmed the awarding of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be in line with ERISA’s overarching purpose: providing plaintiffs with access to the federal court system in their attempts to recover benefits to which they believe they are entitled. With respect to supposedly “duplicative” hours billed, the court cited case law: “a lot of legal work product will grow stale; a competent lawyer won’t rely on last year’s, or even last month’s, research.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Essentially, the court inferred that since the law itself changes, so must an attorney’s research undergo diligent updating. As for the tendency of several lawyers to work on the same set of tasks, while the court acknowledged it as a genuine concern, it found that where there is appropriate division of labor among the attorneys—in their example from the present case, one attorney drafts a document while others review it carefully—there is little need to worry about the reasonableness of work thus accomplished. The court deducted only $2,100 from the total of the Plaintiff’s counsel’s fees, stemming from a charge of 7.8 hours for half a day’s mediation work. With regard to the issue of “boilerplate” language in legal pleadings and other documents, the court accepted the view of the Plaintiff’s counsel that not using such language would only have occupied more of their time: “the time spent preparing this Motion would have been substantially greater had they not efficiently re-used past efforts.” Finally, the court did not find that the Plaintiff’s counsel’s block-billing reached the point where a reviewer could not tell “how much time was spent on particular activities,” and neither did it accept MetLife’s argument that preparing subpoenas using partially recycled language, or preparing exhibits, was too “clerical” to call for an attorney’s full hourly fee.

In summary, the court’s decision prevents defendant insurers from too easily challenging the fees claimed by counsel in their efforts to help ERISA clients recover duly owed long-term disability benefits.

Los Angeles Daily Journal Publishes Article on October 26, 2018 by Robert McKennon Entitled “Court says insurer can’t dodge coverage through ‘technical escape hatch’”

In the October 26, 2018 issue of the Los Angeles Daily Journal, the Daily Journal published an article written by the McKennon Law Group’s Robert J. McKennon. The article addresses a recent case by the California Court of Appeal, which held that the notice-prejudice rule precluded the denial of life insurance benefits based upon the insured’s failure to give timely notice of disability as required under a disability premium waiver provision in the life insurance policy. Insurers often attempt to argue that a technical violation of the notice requirements voids their claim where there exists no prejudice to them. This recent opinion helps to reinforce the notice-prejudice rule in California and helps to protect insureds.

This article is posted with the permission of the Los Angeles Daily Journal.

Court says insurer can’t dodge coverage through ‘technical escape hatch’

A recent Court of Appeal opinion said the notice-prejudice rule precluded the denial of life insurance benefits based upon the insured’s failure to give timely notice of disability as required under a disability premium waiver provision in the life insurance policy.

By Robert J. McKennon

Most first-party insurance policies, including life insurance, disability insurance, property insurance and liability insurance policies, require that an insured policyholder provide notice of a claim within a specified period of time, typically, “as soon as practicable,” “during the Elimination Period” or a similar formulation. See e.g. Ins. Code Section 10350.7 (requirement in disability policies). With respect to liability insurance policies, notice of a claim is required in both claims-made and occurrence policies. Notice generally must be given within a “reasonable time” or within a specified period. Insurance policies often specify that timely reporting of claims is a condition precedent to coverage.

In the case of claims-made policies, the requirement is considered a fundamental element of the insurance contract, and it typically is included in the policy’s insuring agreement. Failure to provide timely notice — especially failure to provide notice within the policy period or grace period of a claims-made policy — can result in a loss of coverage regardless of whether the insurer is prejudiced by the delay in giving notice.

This rule is different in occurrence policies and life and disability insurance policies. But even where a policy specifies that timely notice is a condition precedent to coverage, a policyholder-friendly rule known as the “notice-prejudice rule” has been adopted by the California courts. The rule provides that unless an insurer can demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice from late notice of a claim, the insured’s failure to provide timely notice will not defeat coverage. See, e.g., Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 141-43 (1970); Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Essex Insurance Co., 98 Cal. App. 4th 86, 97 (2002); Root v. American Equity Specialty Insurance Co., 130 Cal. App. 4th 926, 936 (2005).

In both first- and third-party cases, in the absence of prejudice from the delay, an insurer generally may not refuse a claim solely because of delayed notice from the insured: “(T)hough an insurer may assert a defense based upon an alleged breach of the notice requirements of the policy, the breach cannot be a valid defense unless the insurer was substantially prejudiced thereby.” See Downey Saving & Loan Ass’n v. Ohio Casualty. Insurance Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1072, 1089 (1987) (emphasis added).

Further, the burden is on the insurer to prove actual and substantial prejudice: “An insured’s failure to comply with the notice or claims provisions in an insurance policy will not excuse the insurer’s obligations under the policy unless the insurer proves it was substantially prejudiced by the late notice …. Prejudice is not presumed from delayed notice alone …. The insurer must show actual prejudice, not the mere possibility of prejudice.” See Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Parks, 170 Cal. App. 4th 992, 1003-1004 (2009) (internal quotes and citations omitted).

In Lat v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 2018 DJDAR 10235 (Oct. 18, 2018), the California Court of Appeal held that the notice-prejudice rule precluded the denial of life insurance benefits based upon the insured’s failure to give timely notice of disability as required under a disability premium waiver provision in the life insurance policy.

In December 1993, Maria Carada purchased an “occurrence” flexible premium universal life insurance policy from Farmers. The policy contained a “Waiver of Deduction Rider” under which Farmers agreed “waive the monthly deductions due after the start of and during [Carada’s] continued total disability,” if she provided Farmers with timely written notice and proof of her disability. The rider provided that Farmers needed to receive written notice of disability during the period of disability “unless it can be shown that notice was given as soon as reasonably possible.” The rider “will end when,” among other events, “the policy ends.”

In August 2012, Carada was diagnosed with cancer and became disabled. Carada did not pay the premiums due under the policy while she was disabled. On July 23, 2013, Farmers informed her that the policy had lapsed due to her failure to pay premiums. In August 2013, Carada contacted the insurance agent who had sold her the policy and advised the agent of her illness and disability and asked if the policy could be reinstated. The agent informed a Farmers representative that Carada was dying of cancer and asked if the policy could be reinstated. The representative told the agent that the policy had lapsed and could not be reinstated. The agent relayed this information to Carada. Carada died on Sept. 23, 2013.

Thereafter, the beneficiaries under the policy contacted Farmers to file a claim for the policy’s death benefits. Farmers told the beneficiaries they were not entitled to receive death benefits due to the lapse of the policy. The beneficiaries then sued Farmers alleging causes of action against Farmers for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of its agent.

Farmers moved for summary judgment, claiming that once the policy lapsed, the rider ended and could not be invoked by the policy’s beneficiaries. The trial court granted Farmers’ motion for summary judgment, and the beneficiaries appealed the ruling. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Farmers was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment. The court found Farmers’ argument, that a lapse of the policy terminated the rider and termination of the rider precluded the beneficiaries’ claim, to be circular. The court determined that under application of the notice-prejudice rule, Farmers must prove that it suffered actual prejudice from the delayed notice of Carada’s disability, and Farmers failed to assert or prove it was prejudiced by the delayed notice. The court explained that if “Farmers had provided that benefit, Carada’s policy would have been in force at the time of her death. Indeed, the only reason Farmers terminated Carada’s policy was that it applied the deductions it had promised Carada it would waive.”

The court rejected Farmer’s analogy to claims-made policies, which are not subject to the notice-prejudice rule, stating that the insured’s policy “is an occurrence policy as to coverage for her disability as well as coverage for her death. Applying the notice-prejudice rule in this instance would not, therefore, transform a claims made and reported policy into an occurrence policy or … effectively rewrite the contract between the parties.” The court concluded that applying the rule would serve the purpose of preventing an insurance company from shielding itself from its contractual obligations through “a technical escape hatch.”

It is always best to provide notice of a claim or relevant event to an insurance company as soon as possible. However, it is not always possible for insureds to provide timely notice. The notice-prejudice rule allows insureds to fairly access their often much needed policy benefits in the face of insurer arguments that a technical violation of the notice requirements voids their claim where there exists no prejudice to them. The Lat case is thus a welcome addition to the notice-prejudice rule jurisprudence in California.

Robert J. McKennon is a shareholder of McKennon Law Group PC in its Newport Beach office. His practice specializes in representing policyholders in life, health and disability insurance, insurance bad faith, ERISA and unfair business practices litigation. He can be reached at (949) 387-9595 or rm@mckennonlawgroup.com. His firm’s California Insurance Litigation Blog can be found at mslawllp.com.

McKennon Law Group PC Insurance Litigation Blog Ranked as Top 50 Insurance Law Blog in the U.S.

On September 21, 2018, Feedspot created a list of the Top 50 Insurance Law Blogs, News Websites and Newsletters to Follow in 2018. McKennon Law Group PC | Insurance Litigation Blog was selected by the panelists at Feedspot as one of the Top 50 Insurance Law Blogs and was selected the 13^th overall Law Blog among thousands on the internet. Feedspot ranked the Insurance Law Blogs on the web using Google reputation and search ranking, influence and popularity on social media, quality and consistency of posts and Feedspot’s own editorial team and expert review. The article is posted below:

This article is posted with the permission of Feedpost. Sep. 21, 2018.

<https://blog.feedspot.com/insurance_law_blogs/>

McKennon Law Group PC’s Trial Victory Included in Los Angeles Daily Journal’s September 21, 2018 List of Top Verdicts & Settlements

In the September 21, 2018 issue of the Los Angeles Daily Journal, the Daily Journal published a list of its top “Verdicts & Settlements,” which included the McKennon Law Group’s case of Brian Wright v. AON Hewitt Absence Management LLC, et al. The judgment in Mr. Wright’s favor was rated as the third highest award of damages for a plaintiff for the period of time covered. The McKennon Law Group PC represented Mr. Wright in a dispute over the payment of short-term and long-term disability benefits. We won this ERISA case at trial and our client was awarded all of his disability insurance benefits, attorney’s fees, costs and interest. The list includes a summary of the case. To review the article, take a look at the blog, here.

Get the Answers and Assistance You Need