General liability insurers and their agents often lure commercial clients with grandiose promises of coverage for business operations, but upon receiving a notice of a claim, interpret their policy exclusions liberally to limit what they consider covered business operations so as to deny coverage.  A recent case from the California Court of Appeal, Baek v. Continental, 2014 Cal App. LEXIS 893 (2d Dist. Oct. 6, 2014) (“Baek”), expanded on an insurer’s broad duty to defend wherever there is a potential for coverage but in this case denied a duty to defend.

Baek involved a Heaven Massage Wellness Center (“HMWC”) client, “Jaime W.,” who brought suit against HMWC and her massage therapist (“Jaime W. action”), Luiz Baek (“Baek”), for sexual assault during a massage, alleging Baek handled the “Plaintiff’s breasts, buttocks, inner thighs and genitals.”  HMWC had a general liability insurance policy with Continental Casualty Co. (“Continental”) which covered employees or partners “only for acts within the scope of their employment” or committed “while performing duties related to the conduct of [HMWC’s] business.”  Continental asserted there was no coverage, and HMWC sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  The trial court granted summary judgment for Continental.  Subsequently, Baek filed suit against Continental, alleging it had a duty to defend and indemnify him in the Jaime W. action as a covered employee of HMWC.  Continental demurred on the ground that Baek was acting beyond his scope of employment.  Baek then amended his complaint to include a breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and fraud against Continental.  Once again, Continental demurred and trial court again sustained the demurrer, finding there was no coverage, and no potential for coverage, because Baek’s actions did not fall within his scope of his employment.  Baek filed a timely appeal.

The California Court of Appeal first addressed whether Baek qualified as an “employee” of HMWC eligible for coverage.  Baek argued Continental owed him a duty of defense because the complaint in the Jaime W. action alleged that Baek was either a partner or employee of HMWC and the alleged sexual assault occurred within the scope of his employment, or while performing his duties related to HMWC’s business.  Conversely, Continental argued that Baek did not qualify for coverage because his complaint alleged he was an independent contractor, and thus he did not qualify as an employee or partner of HMWC.  As an initial matter, the court explained an insurer’s duty to defend was triggered when the insured becomes aware of, or a third party suit pleads, facts sufficient to give rise to the potential for coverage under the policy.  This duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, and an insurer may have a duty to defend if there is a potential of coverage, even if no damages are awarded and any doubts concerning the potential for coverage and a duty to defend were resolved in favor of the insured.  Continental knew the plaintiff in the Jaime W. action would attempt to prove Baek was HMWC’s employee or partner under the HMWC policy.  However, Continental argued Baek’s complaint alleged he signed an independent contractor agreement, and thus did not qualify as an employee or partner of HMWC.  The court disagreed, noting that although Baek signed an independent contractor agreement with HMWC, he did not allege he was an independent contractor so as to preclude coverage.  The court clarified that an insurer’s duty to defend arises if allegations by the third party, rather than the potential insured, taken as true, reveal a potential for coverage.  Here, the complaint in the Jaime W. action alleged that Baek was, at all relevant times, an employee, owner or partner of HMWC.  The court explained that in its coverage determination, Continental was bound to accept these allegations as true unless extrinsic facts established otherwise.  Therefore, for coverage purposes, Continental had to assume Baek’s status as an employee under HMWC’s policy to determine whether there was a duty to defend.

Next, the court addressed whether Baek’s alleged sexual assault fell within the scope of his employment so as to trigger coverage by reviewing two cases involving similar issues.  First, the court reviewed Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, 12 Cal. 4th 291 (1995) which involved an ultrasound technician who sexually molested a patient during an ultrasound exam by inserting the ultrasound wand and his fingers into her vagina.  There, the court held the technician’s employment did not motivate or engender the sexual molestation; rather, the technician took advantage of his work environment and consciously committed an assault for reasons unrelated to his work.  In addition, the court clarified that although the technician’s job involved examining or physical contact with a patient’s otherwise private areas, his assault on the ultrasound patient was not a foreseeable consequence of that contact.  Accordingly, the sexual assault was an independent decision unrelated to his duties.  Next, the Court of Appeal examined Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 11 Cal. 4th 992 (1995) where a deputy sheriff’s lewd propositioning and offensive touching of others at a county jail were found to fall outside the scope of employment, despite the proximity to the workplace.  The ruling court noted that where an employee’s tort was “‘personal in nature, mere presence at the place of employment and attendance to occupational duties prior or subsequent to the offense’” did not “bring the tort within the scope of employment.”  The Court of Appeal explained that like the ultrasound technician in Lisa M., Baek’s employment as a massage therapist gave him the opportunity to be alone with Jaime W., but nothing in the facts suggested the alleged assault was “‘engendered by’ or an ‘outgrowth’ of his employment,” and his motivation for committing the sexual assault was unrelated to his work.  Hence, his action did not occur within the scope of his employment contemplated under the Continental policy.

The Court of Appeal determined Baek’s alleged touching of Plaintiff’s breasts, buttocks, inner thighs and genitals “indisputably were not ‘duties related to the conduct of [HMWC’s] business’” or the acts he was hired to perform, but constituted a “stepping away” from HMWC’s business, as the acts were performed for Baek’s own benefit, rather than HMWC’s.  Accordingly, the court concluded Baek’s acts were not related to, and did not occur, with respect to the conduct of HMWC’s business so as to trigger coverage.

Finally, the Court of Appeal rejected Baek’s arguments that even if Continental had no duty to defend the sexual assault allegations, it had a duty to defend Jaime W.’s claims of negligence and false imprisonment.  Briefly, the court explained the duty to defend depended on whether the alleged facts reveal a possibility of coverage, not the labels given to the causes of action.  The complaint in the Jaime W. action alleged the massage was negligent, each defendant was negligent in hiring, training and supervising Baek and Baek deprived Plaintiff of her freedom of movement by use of deceit in setting up the massage room.  First, the court explained that sexual fondling is an intentional act such that Baek could not be found to liable for negligence or failing to use due care in performing the massage or supervising his own actions.  Second, the court stated the false imprisonment allegations were “inextricably intertwined” with the alleged assault, for which there was no coverage.  Accordingly, Continental had no duty to defend these allegations.

The good holding in Baek for insureds is that persons who work under an independent contractor agreement may be eligible for coverage under the employer’s general liability policy because a third party complaint alleges he or she was a covered “employee.”  Although the court ultimately held there was no coverage, this decision is significant for policyholders as it explains that even though the insured executed an independent contractor agreement, the acts by its so-called independent contractor may be within the scope of coverage under such a policy.