In actions brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), two roads diverge in federal court—and the court’s choice regarding the applicable standard of review can make all the difference in the scope of permissible evidence.  If the court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review, the court more typically (but not always) only considers evidence received by the insurer in time for its decision and limits its review to the “administrative record” to determine whether the insurer’s denial was an abuse of discretion.  Alternatively, the court may review a case “de novo,” and may consider documents not previously provided to the insurer to determine whether the insured is entitled to benefits. 

Prior case law holds a district court must review a plan administrator’s decision de novo, “unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits.”  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded upon this holding, by defining what constitutes the “benefit plan.”  The Ninth Circuit clarified that where a Summary Plan Description (“SPD”) which was not defined as an official plan document unambiguously granted discretionary authority to a plan administrator to decide claims, but an insurance certificate, an official plan document, did not grant discretionary authority, the official plan document governed.  Because the governing plan document, the insurance certificate, did not grant the insurer discretionary authority, the district court was required to review the case de novo.  Prichard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6553 (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2015).  Prichard is significant as the de novo standard is arguably more favorable to insureds, because it not only provides a less deferential standard of review, but insureds may be able to conduct discovery and supplement the administrative record to offer evidence that administrators acted with bias or to bring in additional medical evidence to support a disability.

Prichard involved a fairly standard ERISA claim by Matthew Prichard, an insured, against Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) for his long-term disability insurance benefits.  Prichard’s policy contained a 24-month benefits period for mental limitations.  Prichard filed for, and received, benefits for his psychiatric disability for a period just shy of 24 months.  Subsequently, MetLife requested additional information demonstrating Prichard was disabled due to non-limited conditions, received his updated medical records and decided there was insufficient medical evidence to support his claim.  Prichard appealed unsuccessfully, then brought suit for a continuation of his ERISA benefits under 29 U.S.C. section 1132(a)(1)(B).

The district court addressed whether the applicable standard of review was de novo or abuse of discretion.  MetLife pointed to unambiguous language in its SPD granting the plan fiduciary “discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Plan,” and argued for the abuse of discretion standard of review.  Prichard argued the Supreme Court holding in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) stating the terms of plan summaries may not be enforced as the plan itself precluded MetLife from asserting that the SPD language was the Plan language.  Prichard further argued that no other plan documents conferred discretionary authority on MetLife, and therefore the district court should review the case de novo.  The district court found the SPD was a governing plan document which unambiguously granted MetLife discretionary authority to determine claims and benefit eligibility.  Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review, the district court held that MetLife did not abuse its discretion in denying Prichard disability benefits.  Prichard timely appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that a district court must review a plan administrator’s denial of benefits de novo, unless the benefit plan gave the administrator discretionary duty to determine eligibility for benefits.  The Court noted that Amara involved a dispute in which there was an SPD and a written plan instrument, and the plan administrator sought to enforce the SPD’s terms over those of the plan instrument.  MetLife sought to enforce the SPD as the one and only formal plan document.  It argued that previous federal court decisions have accepted the SPD as the formal plan document where the terms of the SPD did not add to, or contradict, the terms of existing Plan documents.  In light of these decisions, the Court explained that the SPD terms do not govern if they conflict with governing plan documents, and similarly, the SPD cannot create terms beyond those in the governing plan documents.  However, the Court rejected MetLife’s argument that the SPD and the plan “are one and the same.”  The Court determined that the SPD clearly stated the only plan documents are 1) a Group Policy (including the certificate), 2) IBM’s application and 3) any amendments or endorsements to the Group Policy.  The Court noted that while the insurance certificate was plainly listed as a plan document, “[c]onspicuously absent from this exclusive list was the SPD.”  Further, MetLife carried the burden of providing other official plan documents, such as a document containing the discretionary language, but failed to do so.  As such, the SPD was the only plan document provided to the Court, and it did not grant discretionary authority to MetLife.  The court also noted that “the SPD itself declares ‘official plan documents. . . remain the final authority’ and ‘shall govern’” if the SPD terms conflict with official plan documents.  Finally, the Court of Appeal stated:

Because the official insurance certificate contains no discretion-granting terms, we will not, consistent with Amara, hold that the SPD’s grant of discretion constitutes an additional term of the Plan.

Accordingly, the Court held the district court erred in reviewing MetLife’s denial under the abuse of discretion standard of review, and remanded for a de novo review.

While Prichard turned on a technical distinction—what constitutes an official plan document, it affirms the idea that an insurer does not have discretionary authority absent clear language in official plan documents.  Therefore, unless an insurer establishes it has discretionary authority under such documents, a court must apply a de novo standard of review.  This de novo standard can be outcome determinative.